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Abstract 
 
The control of inflation requires a forecast of the future path of the price level and its indicators. 
Targeting inflation directly requires that the central bank (SARB) form forecasts of the likely 
path of prices paying close attention to a variety of indicators that shows the predictive power of 
inflation in the past periods. Inflation indicators might be cointegrated with the rate of inflation 
to predict the future inflation rates. Forecasting inflation may be very difficult at a particular 
period due to the fact that the array candidate indicators of inflation may neither be very stable 
nor very strong in their relationships with the rate of inflation. Although this might be the case, 
this research uses testable effects of each of the South African inflation indicators to the rate of 
inflation using econometrics tools to find that they have a long run trend with the rate of inflation 
in South Africa. It has been found that each of the indicator variables has a long run relationship 
with the rate of inflation. The major conclusion is that inflation indicator variables like money 
supply (M3), oil price, gold price, total employment, interest rates, exchange rates and output 
growth can be useful inflation indicators in targeting the future trends of inflation in South Africa 
according to the data used in this research although some studies in some countries find that 
inflation targeting is an insufficient framework for monetary policy in the presence of financial 
exuberance. The money supply, the oil prices, interest rates, the exchange rates, prices of gold, 
the employment and output growth are co-integrated with the rate of inflation representing a 
long-run relationship. 
Keywords: Inflation Indicators, Cointegration, South Africa, Central Bank and Inflation 
Targeting. 
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Chapter 1 
 
1.0 Introduction and background 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
Monetary policy has been under public scrutiny and has resulted to changes in its conduct and 
design in the past few decades. Due to countries’ trade and integration, monetary policy has been 
focused to the main motive of low inflation and price stability. The current global environment 
needs countries to work hand in hand encouraging trading amongst themselves thereby 
encouraging economic convergence amongst the country’s trading partners. As a result of this, a 
number of developing countries have adopted different monetary policy actions through the use 
of prices of gold, interest rates, exchange rate pegging, monetary targeting, price level targeting, 
and price of oil and so on to hedge themselves from high price levels. The adoption of these 
monetary policy stances has brought about substantial debate on how monetary policy should be 
conducted and the effects it has on the real economy and the rest of the global economy. 
Since the inception of inflation targeting (IT) as a monetary policy in the 1990s, most of the 
countries that had adopted it has not changed to other monetary policies since it has been proved 
to be a better monetary policy. Inflation targeting, pioneered in New Zealand, has a profound 
impact on the economic policy in developing countries like South Africa. According to Bernanke 
et al (1997), the hallmark of inflation targeting is the announcement by the government, the 
central bank, or some combination of the two that in the future the central bank will strive to hold 
inflation at or near some numerically specified level. Most economists concur to this view of 
price stability and that low inflation is better for a healthier economy than high rates of inflation. 
For this reason, most industrialized and non-industrialized countries have adopted inflation 
targeting as a monetary policy.  
Most studies reveal that inflation targeting as a monetary-policy strategy was introduced in New 
Zealand in 1990, has been very successful in terms of stabilizing both inflation and the real 
economy and by 2007 had been adopted by more than twenty industrialized and non-
industrialized countries (see Svensson, L. E. O., 2007; and Angeriz et al., 2007). The Research 
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Department of the Central Bank of Brazil
1
 elucidate that since the 1980s there has been a 
growing consensus worldwide on the importance of price stability as the overriding long-term 
objective for monetary policy. Stable and low inflation is an exceptional condition that leads to 
price stability resulting in most countries implementing a monetary policy objective of inflation 
targeting. High inflation rates results in unstable employment and output. A study by Epstein, G., 
(2007) reviewed that since the inception of inflation targeting, inflation has come down 
worldwide. Countries that adopted inflation targeting as a monetary policy experienced low 
inflation rate figures. 
South Africa (SA) is an open economy that is subject to exogenous shocks which affect inflation. 
These shocks are a result to changes in the inflation indicator variables that include the price of 
gold, the exchange rates, interest rates, the employment rates, the total output, the money supply 
(M3) and the price of oil (SARB, Quarterly Bulletin, October 1997). In an inflation targeting 
regime, a superb example may be a sudden rise in oil prices or drought that alters the rate of 
inflation resulting in a deviation from the targeted range. These aggregate supply shocks such as 
oil price shocks present a thornier monetary policy problem. In this regard, a well implemented 
inflation-targeting regime need not strongly constrain the ability of the monetary authorities to 
respond to such supply shocks. The change in the indicator variables alters the rate of inflation 
and this has since led to countries adopting inflation targeting as a monetary policy. Most often 
the rate of inflation rise owing to the fluctuations in the inflation indicator variables. South 
Africa has adopted inflation targeting since year 2000.  The targeted range has been missed at 
different time intervals since its inauguration as a monetary policy in South Africa. This has 
since presented several asymmetries which are also costly for employment and growth. 
The rate of inflation in South Africa remains above the rates of the country’s main trading 
partners, namely Germany, Japan, the UK and the USA (Akinboade et al, 2001). There is 
therefore a need to determine the extent to which the SARB can combat inflation with the 
traditional instruments of monetary policy such as the money supply and interest rates. The 
South African inflation indicators are therefore the genesis of the study to investigate ways in 
which inflation can be combated. An understanding of these inflation indicators driving and 
                                                             
1
 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/2000/targets/strach11.pdf 
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perpetuating inflation in South Africa should shed light on the SARB’s control over the inflation 
process and the relative efficacy of alternative monetary policy frameworks and instruments. 
1.2 Statement of the research problem  
 
South Africa adopted inflation targeting since 2000 as a policy framework to lowering of 
inflation and inflation volatility. Although this has been the case, the inflation rate has been 
deviating from the target range of 3-6% at different intervals. According to Davis S (2008), 
inflation breaching on the upper end of the inflation target in April 2007 brought about an 
unpopular interest rate hike (a 200 basis point increase since June 2007). This placed the South 
African Reserve Bank Governor and the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) under increasing 
pressure to stabilise the economy. Mnyande, M.,(2009) supports this view by eliciting that the 
inflation outcome exceeded the target range since April 2007, initially under pressure from 
strong domestic demand and international oil and food price increases. The interest rate cycle 
was reversed in December 2008 with a reduction of 50 basis points in the repurchase rate on the 
basis of the expected return of inflation to within the target range. 
According to Akinboade et al (2001), inflation in South Africa is largely structural in nature and 
the monetary authorities have limited control over the main determinants of inflation. This 
suggests that it is difficult to achieve the objective of reducing inflation to the levels prevailing in 
the country’s main trading partners. According to Akinboade et al (2001), (by using data from 
the SARB from 1970 to 2000), they found that inflation reduction is costly in terms of output and 
employment if pursued exclusively by interest rate manipulation and ad infinitum counteracted 
by depreciation of the exchange rate and wage increases in excess of productivity growth.  
The question remains as of why the rate of inflation deviated from the target range at certain time 
intervals and how did the inflation indicators contribute to the failure to achieve the targeted 
range? Are the inflation indicators a useful tool in predicting the rate of inflation in South 
Africa? Are there trends in these inflation indicator variables? 
From the literature of this research paper, the inflation targeting regime has been a subject of 
continuous research since its inception as a tool for assessing and guiding the rate of inflation 
from rising or falling below the targeted range. It might be the case that the SARB fails to predict 
the rate of inflation due to the failure to incorporate the main inflation indicators to predict the 
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inflation rate or that they might be misguided by the effects of temporary shocks on the evolution 
of the rate of inflation. Therefore, the SARB evaluation of inflation indicators will help to predict 
the rate of inflation well.   
In light of such arguments, this study will investigate the SA inflation indicators to predict the 
rate of inflation by cointegration.  
The study will determine: 
 whether inflation indicators (variables) are cointegrated to the rate of inflation (if 
variables move in tandem in the long-term) reflecting a long-term stable relationship 
 whether inflation targeting has been a useful monetary policy in South Africa under the 
period of study and provide policy recommendations 
1.3 Objectives of the study 
 
The objective of the study is to carry out an independent assessment of the inflation indicators to 
find out whether the inflation indicators are cointegrated with the rate of inflation in South Africa 
using secondary data from the SARB website and the Statistics South Africa (SSA) website. This 
study will investigate the effects of inflation indicators on the rate of inflation using South 
African data during the phase of South African Reserve Bank’s inflation-targeting monetary 
policy regime. Very few previous studies have empirically investigated the effects of inflation 
indicators during an inflation-targeting monetary policy period. Thus, this study is an attempt to 
fill this gap and to uncover the variety of interesting relationships specific to an inflation-
targeting era. The most important part will be the identification and analysis of the various 
inflation indicators in relation to the rate of inflation.  
The study will find out whether inflation indicators move in tandem with the rate of inflation in 
the long run and the short run. This study will assess whether inflation targeting is indeed a 
viable monetary policy strategy for the South African economy. The question to whether all pre-
conditions of inflation targeting in South Africa have been met or not and whether these 
preconditions are critical for the successful practice of inflation targeting will be discussed. In 
the absence of these features, does it imply that an alternative monetary policy framework would 
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help to bring superior economic outcomes or are there alternatives similarly compromised in 
South Africa? In conclusion, the study will also provide policy implications. 
1.4 Research hypothesis 
   
The inflation indicators used by the reserve bank are a true replica of the rate of inflation in 
South Africa and they are cointegrated with the inflation rate in South Africa.  In other words, the 
running hypothesis of this study is that exchange rate, money supply (M3), price of oil, price of 
gold, interest rates, total employment rate, and output growth are the major significant indicators 
of South African inflation. In short, the hypothesis is that the mentioned indicators directly and 
strongly influence the level of inflation in the South African economy. 
1.5 Significance of the study 
  
According to Cecchetti, S. G., (1995), if inflation indicators are not well considered, they can fail 
to predict inflation. Some indicators of inflation can yield good results in short term horizons and 
some in the long-term horizons. Some of the inflation indicators can contain information that is 
more relevant in immediate future where as others may be more relevant on an intermediated 
horizon. It is important therefore to incorporate all the inflation indicator variables to predict the 
inflation rate. According to Kozicki, S., (2001), inflation indicators help policymakers to know 
whether they predict inflation by looking at the signals from each of the indicator variables. If 
some of the inflation indicators fail to predict the inflation rate, Kozicki postulates that this will 
result in dropping these inflation indicator variables in predicting the rate of inflation.  
 
According to Cecchetti, S. G., Steindel, C., Chu, R., (2000), if inflation indicators are well 
incorporated, they provide precise inflation predictions. A full knowledge of the inflation 
indicators that impact on the rate of inflation is therefore of great significance to the SARB in 
forecasting inflation. Focusing on core inflation indicators will allow monetary authorities to 
prevent themselves from being misguided by the effects of temporary shocks on the evolution of 
the Consumer Price Index (CPIX). This is significant as the SARB will be able to remove the 
influence of transitory shocks by revealing the unobserved policy relevant trend in inflation. 
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According to Figueiredo, M. R. F. and Staub, R. B., (2001), the analysis and evaluation of the 
different inflation indicators to the prediction of inflation rate helps to eliminate temporary 
fluctuations from consumer price index allowing monetary authorities to identify shocks hitting 
the inflation rate that do not affect the trend inflation. Temporary shocks, despite influencing the 
headline index, are quickly reversed without affecting expectations and, therefore, do not 
demand a policy response from the monetary authority. 
 
The purpose of this contribution is to examine the inflation rate and the inflation indicators in 
South Africa and investigate whether the inflation indicators move in a tandem with the inflation 
rate. For example, the inflation outcomes in the short run may be the result of several factors 
other than monetary policy especially for an open economy like South Africa. It is important 
then to analyze the performance of the South African central bank on why they missed their 
targeted range at different intervals and assess the role of inflation indicators.  
 
1.6 South Africa as an economy: An assessment 
 
South Africa has adopted inflation targeting since year 2000. Although inflation targeting has 
been criticized by many researchers through its apparent inability to reduce the so-called 
sacrifice ratio, the unemployment costs of fighting inflation, it has been an essential tool to the 
South African economy development as it has been anchoring long-run inflation expectations in 
South Africa. Burger et al (2009) studies whether or not the official inflation targeting regime in 
South Africa improves inflation performance compared to the unofficial (implicit) inflation 
target regime in South Africa of the period 1990-2000. The paper argues that improved inflation 
performance is not only measured in terms of a lower inflation rate. In South Africa, since the 
implementation of inflation targeting, the CPIX exceeded its 6% upper bound in 29 of the 72 
months between January 2002 (the first month of the first year that inflation had to be within its 
target range given a 24 month policy lag) and December 2007 (Burger et al, 2009). This has seen 
the MPC and the Governor of the SARB to work consistently to control the rate of inflation back 
to the targeted range. 
With reference to the on-going quest for low rate of inflation in different countries, many 
concepts have been proposed and promoted before. For example,  the use of inflation targeting 
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and other policy alternatives that include exchange rate targeting, real targeting (Epstein, G., 
2003), monetary aggregates (Svensson, L. E. O., 2007), price level targeting (Hagen et al, 2001 ) 
etc has helped to lower the rate of inflation.  Some of these concepts took ‘flavour of the month’ 
status and quickly vanished off the shelves, while others had significant impacts on monetary 
policy efficiency and success and are still being used to date.  Inflation targeting can also be seen 
as one of these proposals, even though its impact and whether it will remain in use for a long 
time, is yet to be evaluated. This study draws reference to this perspective, where its main 
objective is to evaluate the actual impact of inflation targeting using inflation indicators in South 
Africa. 
1.7 Suggested conclusion 
  
Each of the inflation indicators of inflation must be cointegrated with the rate of inflation both in 
the short and long run. Rejecting the alternative hypothesis will mean that inflation targeting 
helps South Africa achieve lower inflation in the long run, reduce the response to oil price and 
exchange rate shocks, strengthen monetary policy independence, improve monetary policy 
efficiency, and obtain inflation outcomes that are closer to target levels. These benefits of 
inflation targeting increase when inflation targeters achieve control over inflation and South 
Africa will be able to implement a stationary inflation target. In addition, the credibility of an 
inflation-targeting regime will improve once it becomes a stationary regime. 
1.8 Expected contribution to knowledge 
 
This study will generate valuable knowledge for the benefit of all stakeholders who rely on 
knowing the real causes of inflation to guide them in decision making. This study will also add 
into the library of knowledge already available from previous studies and can be used as a 
benchmark for further research in this area. 
1.9 Research outline 
 
This dissertation has been divided into seven chapters.  
1.9.1 Chapter 1: Introduction and background 
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This first chapter focuses on the problem statement which is the basis of the study. The 
significance of undertaking the study was highlighted in the chapter. The background to the 
study as well as specific literature related to the study at hand was discussed. Furthermore, the 
problem statement, research objectives, research hypotheses, and the expected contribution to 
knowledge have been highlighted in the chapter. 
1.9.2 Chapter 2: An overview of inflation targeting, definition and indicators 
  
This second chapter outlines the inflation indicators of South Africa and gives a general 
overview of inflation targeting using recent studies. Definitions of inflation targeting from 
different scholars have been discussed. A discussion has been provided on the generic elements 
in the definition of inflation targeting. The chapter shows the trend of inflation for the period 
under study. An overview of the South African inflation targeting has been outlined with more 
emphasis on the trend of inflation and the indicators of inflation in South Africa. The term 
inflation has been clearly defined and the impact that inflation causes to an economy has been 
outlined. Each one of the leading inflation indicators of inflation in South Africa has been 
elaborated with relevance to the related literature. 
1.9.3 Chapter 3: Literature review on inflation indicators 
  
Chapter three focuses on the review of the related literature. The importance of inflation 
indicators in targeting inflation and a background of the monetary policy in South Africa with 
reference to the past and how it currently works has been elicited. Lastly, this chapter also 
explains how the current monetary policy under inflation targeting is conducted. 
1.9.4 Chapter 4:Inflation targeting implementation, preconditions, elements and challenges 
   
The forth chapter focuses on inflation targeting implementation, precondition, elements and 
challenges of implementing an inflation targeting framework. The chapter also highlighted the 
importance of inflation targeting in passing in the developing world. The preconditions and 
prerequisites of an inflation targeting regime have been outlined and an explanation of each of 
them has been given in this chapter. Overally, Chapter 4 deals with the implementation, 
challenges and preconditions of inflation targeting in South Africa. 
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1.9.5 Chapter 5: Critiques and country specific alternatives to an inflation targeting regime 
   
Chapter five explains the critiques and country specific alternatives of inflation targeting. The 
chapter explains a number of frameworks that are used internationally in the case where inflation 
targeting is not applicable whether due to lack of preconditions or countries not yet ready to 
adopt the framework. These alternatives explained in this chapter includes exchange rate 
targeting, real targeting, monetary aggregates, price level targeting and inflation targeting 
framework. These alternatives are fully explained in this chapter. 
1.9.6 Chapter 6: Model specification, results and policy implications 
  
Chapter six focuses on model robustness and articulates the policy implications of results. 
 
1.9.7 Chapter 7: Conclusions, recommendations and areas for further research 
 
Chapter seven outlines and incorporates the summary and main conclusions of the study 
(conclusions, recommendations and areas for further research), the list of references and the 
appendices.  
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Chapter 2 
2.0 Overview of inflation targeting, definition and indicators 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Inflation targeting is a monetary-policy strategy that was introduced in New Zealand in 1990, has 
been very successful in terms of stabilizing both inflation and the real economy, and by 2007 had 
been adopted by more than 20 industrialized and non-industrialized countries (Svensson, L. E. 
O., 2007), This view is also supported by Levin, T. A., et al (2004) in their study of the 
macroeconomic effects of inflation targeting using data of industrialized economies. The authors 
found that inflation targeting has played a role in anchoring inflation expectations and in 
reducing inflation expectations through their analysis of a decade of inflation targeting 
experience for industrial countries. Stable and low inflation results in price stability and this has 
since resulted in most countries adopting a monetary policy objective of inflation targeting. This 
is due to the fact that high inflation rates results in unstable employment and output further 
resulting in an inequitable distribution of wealth and resources within the economy.  
2.2 Defining the inflation targeting regime 
 
There is a large and growing literature on inflation targeting that includes much disagreement 
about what it is and whether it is better monetary policy. Bernanke et al (1999) document the 
success of inflation targeting while being a bit vague about the exact definition of the concept. 
An inflation targeting regime can be defined as a strategy for conducting monetary policy with 
the overriding and explicit objective of achieving and maintaining price stability, represented by 
an easily understandable, numerical target value for inflation.  
According to Scott, R. N., Batini, P. B. and Kochhar, K., (2006), in an inflation-focused 
monetary policy, other important goals such as rapid economic growth and employment creation 
are seen as inappropriate direct targets of central bank policy; rather they are viewed as hoped for 
even presumed byproducts of an inflation focused approach to monetary policy. This really 
means that according to this orthodox approach to monetary policy the focus of policy is on 
stabilization rather than growth or development, with an implicit assumption that once 
stabilization is achieved, economic growth, employment creation, and poverty reduction will 
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follow. Svensson, L. E. O., (2007), argues that the essence of inflation targeting is a commitment 
to adjust policy to ensure that a credible or unbiased forecast of future inflation falls within the 
specified target.  
According to Hazirolan in David et al (2002), inflation targeting is not a method to reduce the 
current inflation but an anchor to monitor and control price stability in an economy after a 
thorough disinflation period. Given this target, the central bank is typically allowed flexibility to 
choose the combination of monetary policy instrument settings it judges most appropriate to 
achieve the objective based on the most complete information available. These decisions are 
announced and explained to the public, thus increasing the transparency of monetary policy. As 
an obvious counterpart, the central bank is made accountable for attaining the inflation goal.  
As can be seen from the above definitions of inflation targeting, there is no universal definition 
of inflation targeting. There are variable definitions to the concept of inflation targeting. 
However, in these definitions there are also generic elements which define an inflation targeting 
regime. Some of the different definitions of inflation targeting are discussed below. 
Table 2.1: Definition of inflation targeting according different scholars 
 
Definition  Reference  Description 
A Tutar, E., (2002:1) Inflation targeting is characterized by the public 
announcement of official target ranges or quantitative 
targets for the inflation rate at one or more time 
horizons and by explicit acknowledgement that low 
and stable inflation is the long run primary objective 
of the monetary policy. 
B Englama, A., et al (2009) Inflation targeting is a monetary policy regime, which 
is characterized by public announcement of official 
target ranges or quantitative targets for price level 
increases and by explicit acknowledgement that low 
inflation is the most crucial long-run objective of the 
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monetary authorities. 
C Boughrara, A., et al., 
(2008:2) 
Inflation targeting is a strategy that aims primarily at 
controlling inflation and makes it the main objective 
of monetary policy, but it goes well beyond the simple 
adoption of a quantitative goal for inflation. A central 
bank following inflation targeting has to set up well-
defined rules and performance goals for which it is 
held accountable by the media, the markets and the 
government. However, unlike a passive monetary 
policy rule, inflation targeting gives the central bank 
enough discretion to attain its inflation target and also 
to pursue other objectives, such as real output 
stabilization. This signifies that the central bank has a 
single main target, which is to lower inflation to a 
specified level, but may still be concerned with output 
volatility as long as it is consistent with its inflation 
target. 
D Epstein, G., (2003:3-4) Inflation targeting is a particular example of the “neo-
liberal” approach to central banking. Neo-liberal 
central banks attempt to: keep inflation at a very low 
level; reduce central bank support for government 
fiscal deficits; help manage the country’s integration 
into world trade and financial markets; dramatically 
reduce the influence of democratic social and political 
forces on central bank policy. The major claims made 
by advocates of inflation targeting are that it will: 
 • Reduce the rate of inflation 
• Enhance the credibility of monetary policy 
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•Reduce the sacrifice ratio associated with 
contractionary monetary policy 
• Help to attract foreign investment 
E Mishkin, F. S., (2001:1) Inflation targeting is a recent monetary policy strategy 
that encompasses five main elements: 
1) the public announcement of medium-term 
numerical targets for inflation;  
2) an institutional commitment to price stability as the 
primary goal of monetary policy, to which other goals 
are subordinated; 
 3) an information inclusive strategy in which many 
variables, and not just monetary aggregates or the 
exchange rate, are used for deciding the setting of 
policy instruments;  
4) increased transparency of the monetary policy 
strategy through communication with the public and 
the markets about the plans, objectives, and decisions 
of the monetary authorities; and 
 5) increased accountability of the central bank for 
attaining its inflation objectives. 
 
2.2.1 Generic elements to the definitions of inflation targeting 
 
Price stability 
 
Price stability is the pre-eminent objective of monetary policy in an inflation targeting regime. 
According to Angeriz et al., (2007), Mboweni, (1999), in pursuing an inflation targeting strategy, 
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countries commit themselves to price stability as the main objective of monetary policy, along 
with stipulating that medium-to-long-term inflation is the nominal anchor where an inflation 
target is set. Price stability means that the price level remains constant, that is, that the inflation 
rate is zero. Alan Greenspan in Mishkin, F. S., (2001)
2
 defines price stability as a rate of inflation 
that is sufficiently low that households and businesses do not have to take it into account in 
making everyday decisions and can be an inflation number between zero and 3%. Tutar, E., 
(2002) states that the central bank must show clearly and unambiguously that its most crucial 
aim is to provide an environment with stable prices. Tutar argued that inflation-targeting regime 
has been implemented by some of the developed and developing countries in the recent years 
because it has the advantage of removing some of the problems associated with intermediate 
targets by focusing mainly on the most important goal of monetary policy, which is price 
stability. 
Communication 
 
Among other important features of inflation targeting are vigorous efforts to communicate with 
the public about the plans and objectives of the monetary authorities and in many cases, 
mechanisms that strengthen the central bank's accountability for attaining the set objectives. The 
experience of all the inflation-targeting countries has demonstrated that the central bank needs to 
communicate clearly with the public the reasons for its policy actions (Debelle, G., 1999). The 
SARB, at all times and in different platforms must make attempts to conduct open-mouth 
operations to morally persuade businesses and public entities to price within the inflation-target 
range. Greater public understanding about what the central bank is doing and why will help to 
increase policy credibility particularly in the event of some deviation from the target. Credibility 
simply means central banks do what they say they will do. To gain credibility, many central 
banks are now committing themselves to an inflation target. The corollary is that central banks 
that have consistently achieved low inflation and better managed their economies have greater 
credibility. This means once low inflation is achieved, a more credible central bank is better able 
to maintain low inflation. Well-anchored inflation expectations and credibility provide the extra 
                                                             
2
 Mishkin, F. S., (2001). Inflation targeting. Graduate School of Business, Columbia University 
and National Bureau of Economic Research. 
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leeway and flexibility in running a looser monetary policy without the huge price of accelerating 
future inflation. As mentioned above, greater credibility can improve the variability trade-off by 
ensuring that inflation expectations do not adjust rapidly to inflation shocks. The advantage of a 
clearly articulated inflation target is that it provides a framework with which the central bank can 
explain its actions (Debelle, G., 1999). 
Target 
 
Inflation targeting is one of the monetary policies that is different from other policies as it 
involves the announcement of a numerical target. The explicit inflation targeting provides a 
nominal anchor and this anchors inflation expectations. Failure for the central bank to announce 
a target for inflation makes it difficult for economic agents to know and predict the rate of 
inflation as they base on inflation expectations.  
Debelle, G., (1999) in his studies of inflation and output stabilization in Australia points out that 
the first aspect of an inflation-targeting framework that permits some degree of output 
stabilisation is the choice between a point target or a targeting band, and if a band is chosen, its 
width. Specifying a target band allows for the imperfect control of monetary policy over the 
inflation rate. Given the long and variable lags of monetary policy, and given the impossibility of 
perfectly forecasting future inflation, it is not possible to restrict the variability of inflation below 
some minimum level. This view is also supported by Bernanke, B. S. et al., (1997) who purports 
that inflation targets are typically specified as a range and that the use of ranges generally reflects 
not only uncertainty about the link between policy levers and inflation outcomes but is also 
intended to allow the central bank some flexibility in the short run.  
Transparency and accountability 
 
According to Mishkin, F. S., (2001), increased accountability of the central bank for attaining its 
inflation objectives is of crucial significance. The Central Bank is accountable for achieving the 
inflation target and provides explicit and transparent monetary policy reports presenting forecasts 
and explaining policy. This means that the central bank is required to explain why inflation has 
missed the target, what action the central bank is taking to bring inflation back to target and 
when this is expected to happen. In South Africa an important accountability mechanism is 
parliamentary hearings whereby the central bank appears before parliament to provide testimony 
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on monetary policy. The monetary policy committee (MPC) meets and discusses the different 
economic problems, solutions to such problems and the way forward. Accountability strengthens 
policy-makers’ incentives to fulfill the central bank’s mandate thus making the monetary policy 
committee more efficient. Transparency improves the efficiency of monetary policy and allows 
for a more effective management of expectations thereby promoting the discussion and 
evaluation of monetary policy
3
. The reasons why inflation deviated from its target are discussed 
and the measures to be taken to return it to target. This will then be disseminated through public 
letters, inflation reports, and/or press releases. 
2.3 Overview of inflation targeting in South Africa 
 
Recent studies in the South African economy has reviewed that inflation targeting has been 
successful. Although inflation targeting is not a panacea of inflation and may not be appropriate 
to other countries, it is a highly useful monetary policy in South Africa. Findings by Mnyande, 
M., (2009) reviewed that inflation-targeting framework in South Africa over the recent past years 
has been consistent with higher average output growth. Mnyande found that the inflation 
targeting framework from 1999 to 2008 has been the longest sustained period of economic 
growth in South Africa’s economic history, complemented by both a lower rate of inflation and a 
stable monetary policy. In terms of volatility, the standard deviation of inflation in South Africa 
declined from 3,56 to 2,17 percentage points over this period, while the standard deviation of 
output growth declined from 2,28 to 1,06 percentage points. This means that not only did 
average inflation and inflation variability decline, but output growth variability declined as well. 
This is an indication of a long-term economic growth and development. Kahn (2008) in 
Mnyande, M., (2009) also found that there has been greater stability in the real interest rate, 
measured as the official policy rate (repo rate) adjusted by the inflation rate. On this basis, the 
real policy rate averaged 5,7 per cent in the 1990s, and 3,3 per cent in the inflation-targeting 
period. Of greater significance perhaps is the relative stability of the real rate in the inflation-
targeting period, with the standard deviation falling from 4,08 in the 1990s to 1,29 percentage 
points in the 2000s. 
                                                             
3
 http://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2011/res/pdf/go2.pdf 
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According to Roger, S., (2009), evidence on inflation targeting shows that although inflation 
target ranges are missed frequently in most countries, the inflation and growth performance 
under inflation targeting compares very favorably with performance under alternative 
frameworks. Furthermore, the author propounded that inflation targeters also tentatively appear 
to be coping better with the commodity price and financial shocks in 2007-2009 than non-
inflation targeters. 
According to Mishkin, F. S. and Schmidt-Hebbel. K., (2007), comparative descriptive statistics 
on inflation performance confirms that inflation targeters reduced their average inflation rates 
from 12.6 percent before the adoption of inflation targeting to 4.4 percent thereafter. Inflation 
declined to 6.0 percent in the post-adoption convergence period and then to 2.3 percent after the 
achievement of stationary targets. Emerging-economy inflation targeters recorded an average 6.0 
percent inflation after they adopted inflation targeting, while the corresponding figure was only 
2.2 percent for industrial-economy inflation targeters. The latter figure was close to the average 
2.1 percent inflation recorded among non-targeters since 1997. A similar pattern was observed 
for inflation volatility. Inflation volatility in industrial inflation targeters was twice the level 
recorded in non-targeters, but inflation persistence was slightly lower in industrial inflation 
targeters than in non-targeters.  
Emerging inflation targeters, in turn, achieved a significant reduction in output growth volatility 
and output gap volatility under inflation targeting (Mishkin, F. S., et al, 2007). Non-targeters also 
achieved a significant reduction in both volatility measures after 1997, to levels that are below 
those recorded by industrial inflation targeters. Conclusively, output persistence, like inflat ion 
persistence, has been lower in stationary-target inflation targeters than in non-targeters. This is 
consistent with what was observed by Angeriz, A. and Philip, A., (2009) who found that 
although inflation targeting has gone hand in hand with low inflation, it is very far from 
declaring the strategy as a resounding success. The evidence of their research found that non-
inflation-targeting central banks have also been successful in stabilizing and attaining low 
inflation. 
Although this might be the case, some of the central banks are not yet involved in inflation 
targeting framework maybe due to cost-benefit analysis. They might not yet be sure whether the 
benefits of inflation targeting are greater than the costs involved. Neumann, J. M. M, and von 
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Hagen, J., (2002) found that there is little convincing evidence that inflation targeting improves 
inflation performance and policy credibility and lower sacrifice ratio. The authors argued that the 
environment of the 1990s was in general terms a stable economic environment, a period friendly 
to price stability (Neumann, J. M. M, and von Hagen, J., 2002, p. 129), and that inflation was on 
a downward trend in many countries, especially developed countries, prior to the introduction of 
inflation targeting. Angeriz et al., (2007) postulate that inflation persistence continued to drop 
after the introduction of inflation targeting, helped by the increase in the degree of risk aversion 
to inflation volatility in inflation-targeting countries in the 1990s. This means that inflation 
targeting may have had little impact over what any sensible strategy could have achieved; and 
indeed, non- inflation targeting countries also went through the same experience as inflation 
targeting countries (Cecchetti, S. G. and Ehrmann, M., 1999). Furthermore, Honda, Y., (2000) 
finds no evidence that inflation targeting had an effect on either inflation or any other variable in 
Canada, New Zealand and the UK.  
The above assertion truly represents the early stages of inflation targeting and there was no 
empirical support that was found favoring inflation targeting in these early initial researches. As 
time passed and more historical data has come to the fore, however, researchers have revealed a 
number of important empirical regularities tending to support inflation targeting. Some of the 
evidence comes from single-country case studies suggesting that inflation targeting tends to calm 
down markets. For example, a number of recent empirical studies examined the relationship 
between inflation targeting and macroeconomic performance as well as between inflation 
targeting and financial market behavior: i.e., these studies attempted to assess whether inflation 
targeting matters. While mixed, the bulk of the new evidence indicates that inflation targeting 
matters; inflation targeting has a positive significant impact on economic and financial market 
performance (Saxton, J., 2005). 
The South African economy has been undergoing some inflation oscillations at different times as 
indicated in Figure 2.1 below for the second quarter of year 1997 to the third quarter of the year 
2008 (period under study). It can be deduced that inflation target of 3%-6% was achieved 
successively from the first quarter of 2003 to the first quarter of year 2006 and first quarter of 
year 2007. This has since improved the credibility and effectiveness of South Africa’s macro-
economic policy. The trend however, has shown a marked improvement in the early years of 
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inflation targeting and the years after 2006 has shown a loom in the rate of inflation out of the 
target range. 
 
 
Since the inception of inflation targeting, inflation has come down worldwide in recent decades. 
Inflation targeting avoids the problem of an unstable relationship between the goal and the 
intermediate target by focusing directly on the final goal. It is easily understood by the public, 
and, in practice, has been associated with a significant increase in the transparency and 
accountability of monetary policy in South Africa. However, a disadvantage of inflation 
targeting is the difficulty of directly controlling inflation as it focus merely on the targeted figure 
or a band without control over the main determinants of inflation. Moreover, the long and 
variable lags in monetary policy and the absence of a simple rule may make it complex for the 
public to monitor the performance of the central bank in a timely manner (Mishkin, F. S., 1997; 
Mboweni, T. T., 2000). This research paper will not discuss the advantages and disadvantages of 
an inflation targeting regime but will mention some of them in passing as they have been 
explained somewhere in different papers including Neumann, J. M. M, and von Hagen, J., 
(2002), and Mishkin, F. S., (2000). 
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Figure 2.1: Trend of the inflation rate from 1997Q2 to 2008Q3 (Source: SSA data) 
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In reality, inflation targeting as a monetary policy may be too tight or too loose and most often 
the target is missed although the targeters do not give up. Under inflation targeting, inflation is 
often too low keeping monetary policy too tight that gives negative results. Epstein, G., (2007) 
eludes that once countries adopt inflation targeting, they are locked into it and they feel they 
cannot abandon it for the fear that abandoning inflation targeting will send the wrong signal to 
investors and could prove costly in terms of investor confidence leading perhaps to exchange rate 
instability and capital flight. If this fear of inflation is true, then countries maintain the inflation 
targeting framework, even if they often miss the targets. Most targeters fear abandoning inflation 
targeting when it fails to achieve the required targets. This is a pitfall as it misleads investors and 
lead to exchange rate instability. Epstein, G., (2007:9) refers inflation targeting as a "paper tiger" 
and that it therefore cannot have significant effects for good or ill. Mishkin, F. S., (2000) states 
that inflation targeting causes financial instability. Inflation targeting has a drawback in that a 
high degree of partial dollarization may create a potentially serious problem for inflation 
targeting.  
Although inflation targeting has been criticized by many researchers through its apparent 
inability to reduce the so-called sacrifice ratio, the unemployment costs of fighting inflation as 
aforementioned, it has been an essential tool to the South African economy development. 
Inflation targeting has played a significant role in anchoring long-run inflation expectations in 
South Africa. 
“South Africa has successfully pursued an inflation targeting monetary policy with a 
range of 3 - 6% on a continuous basis since February 2000. The policy has encouraged a 
stable and sustainable economy that has seen an increase in the annual growth rate to an 
average of 3.5% since 1999, and above 5% for 2007” (Davis, S., 2008).  
Cecchetti, S. G., and Ehrmann, M., (2000) in Neumann, J. M. M, et al., (2002) looked at a 
sample of 23 countries, both developed and less developed, 9 of which have central banks 
pursuing inflation targets. A first observation from their data is that inflation rates generally 
came down in the 1990s compared with the 1980s independent of the geographical region of the 
country, their pursuit of inflation targets, or whether they were striving to enter the European 
Monetary Union at the end of the decade. This indicates that the 1990s were a period friendly to 
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increased price stability. Gavin (2003) has the same view that inflation targeting has worked so 
well because it leads policymakers to debate, decide on, and communicate the inflation objective. 
Debelle, G., (1999) evaluated the role of output stabilisation in inflation targeting in a simple 
model which consists of a Phillips curve, aggregate demand equation and the central bank’s loss 
function. He found that inflation targeting does take output stabilisation into account. He argued 
that the inflation-targeting framework has sufficient flexibility to allow for the short-run trade-off 
between output and inflation. The main reason being that inflation targeting reflects some design 
features such as targeting bands and the policy horizon that have been adopted in practice in the 
inflation-targeting countries. Debelle further argued that the medium-term price stability can be 
maintained while still allowing some degree of short-run inflation variability, thus providing 
scope for lower output variability.  
2.4 Inflation 
 
Many economists agree to the conclusion that an inflationary environment is very detrimental to 
the functioning of the economy due to the negative repercussions of inflation. The high and 
volatile rates of inflation are accompanied by high volatility in output and unemployment and by 
low growth in productivity and potential output. According to Ftiti, Z., (2008), inflation is too 
much money pursuing too little goods and it also means instability of prices. The instability of 
prices is a source of uncertainty and it distorts the economic decision process and causes an 
economic instability. Normally this instability results from inflation which emanate from 
liquidity excess as its major origin. Liquidity excess means that there is too much currency for 
enough goods. If the currency in circulation increases, the private agents raise the demand for 
goods and services. If the excess in the liquidity is not accompanied by a proportionate increase 
in production, the prices go up. To abate this, many variables of inflation must be targeted to 
reach the stability of prices.  
Inflation imposes negative externalities on the better and prosperous economies when it 
interferes with an economy’s efficiency. It can lead to price distortion, flourishing of rent-
seeking activities, misallocation of scarce resources and social unrest. This can lead to 
uncertainty about the future profitability of investment projects especially when high inflation is 
associated with increases in price variability. This leads to conservative investment strategies 
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than would otherwise be the case ultimately leading to lower levels of investment and economic 
growth. For example, if a decision maker finances a long-term project with long-term debt, it is 
exposed to the risk of losses in the case of an unexpected disinflation, and if the decision maker 
finances the project with short-term debt, it is exposed to funding risk resulting in decision 
makers less likely to invest in a project that is otherwise viable. 
Inflation may also reduce a country’s international competitiveness by making its exports 
relatively more expensive, thus impacting on the balance of payments. Moreover, inflation can 
interact with the tax system to distort borrowing and lending decisions. Firms may have to 
devote more resources to dealing with the effects of inflation, for example, more vigilant 
monitoring of their competitors’ prices to see if any increases are part of a general inflationary 
trend in the economy or due to more industry specific causes. It also leads to arbitrary 
distribution of wealth and income. Moderate inflation is helpful to growth, but faster economic 
growth feeds back into inflation.  
In reality, low inflation rate and an upward economic growth is never possible. Nevertheless, low 
inflation rate means slow economic growth. It is argued that keeping inflation too low may be 
costly in terms of output volatility, for example due to the existence of nominal and real rigidities 
in relative prices and wages and the lower bound (at zero) to nominal interest rates. Whenever, 
money is in excess, there is bidding by the consumers due to which the cost of goods escalates.  
In conclusion, inflation is bad news. Besides distorting prices, it erodes savings, discourages 
investment, stimulates capital flight into foreign assets, precious metals, or unproductive real 
estate, inhibits growth, makes economic planning a nightmare, and, in its extreme form, evokes 
social and political unrest. It leads to economic stagnation and abysmal poverty. It increases 
inequality by widening the gap between the rich and the poor. The economic quagmire brought 
about by inflation hits the poorest members of society disproportionately and it distorts resource 
allocation in the economy. If there is price stability, it will promote income equality by 
protecting the purchasing power of the poor who do not have adequate real or financial assets 
that serve as a hedge against inflation. Governments consequently regard inflation as a plague 
and try to control it by adopting conservative and sustainable fiscal and monetary policies. 
Experience and convenience have induced most of them to conduct their monetary policy by 
relying on intermediate targets such as monetary aggregates or exchange rates.  
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2.5 Inflation indicators 
2.5.0 Introduction: Leading indicators of inflation in South Africa  
 
Policymakers, politicians, economists and the public at large agree to a consensus of low 
inflation within a selected economy. Price stability is a crucial element for a better economy. 
This has led to economists to come up with nominal anchors that are used to knot down the price 
levels and achieve price stability by promoting stable inflation expectations to the public. If 
inflation is anchored, this will reduce inflation volatility and encourages low inflation. 
Stakeholders need to watch the various nominal anchors constantly and understand what they 
mean. This enables the business owners to react to the external influences that might erode their 
investments and the purchasing power of their assets. In this section, a detailed analysis of each 
of the key inflation indicators is done and a basic overview explanation of each indicator and 
theories relating to them. The candidate inflation indicators for South Africa include money 
supply (M3), exchange rate, employment rate, interest rates, output growth, gold prices and oil 
prices (SARB, Quarterly Bulletin, October 1997).  
This section reviews reasons why these indicator variables predict inflation. The indicators fall 
into two basic groups. One group includes financial variables that might predict inflation because 
they reflect current or expected monetary policy actions. This group includes variables such as 
interest rates, money growth, and exchange rates. The second group includes measures of real 
economic activity that might predict inflation because they provide information on excess 
demand conditions in the economy. This group includes variables such as the employment rate 
and output growth and other variables. These are elaborated as follows: 
 
2.5.1 Money growth (M3)  
 
The money supply is a key component to inflation. According to Milton Friedman, inflation is 
always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon. Money supply is therefore the fulcrum of 
monetary policy that can be used by the central bank in its pursuit of monetary policy objectives 
to lower the rate of inflation within the economy.  
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According to Svensson, L. E. O., (2007), a possible alternative to inflation targeting is money-
growth targeting, whereby the central bank has an explicit target for the growth of the money 
supply. The author argues that money-growth targeting has been tried in several countries but 
been abandoned because practical experience has consistently shown that the relationship 
between money growth and inflation is too unstable and unreliable for money-growth targeting 
to provide successful inflation stabilization. In South Africa money is created mainly through the 
extension of bank credit to the non-bank private sector. Analysts generally agree that money 
growth and inflation are linked to each other. Although central banks conduct monetary policy 
by targeting a short-term interest rate, some central banks have chosen to use an intermediate 
target, such as money growth to guide monetary policy. Countries with relatively rapid increases 
in their money stocks tend to have relatively high inflation rates, and vice versa. Inflation is often 
accompanied by roughly rapid increases in the quantity of money supply in the economy. 
Keynesian policy indicates that the government should aggressively regulate the money supply. 
The concept is that having too much money in the economy causes inflation and having too little 
money causes recessions. If enough people have extra money, demand may exceed money 
supply and prices will rise. Conversely, if no one has any extra money the prices of goods and 
services will tend to fall. The government should then be able to prevent unwanted inflation and 
recession cycles by turning up the money supply when a recession is about to hit and turning it 
down just in time to avoid unacceptably high inflation. Most often regulating the money supply 
would smooth out the oscillations in the business cycles and this result in the stabilization of the 
inflation rate. 
Clearly, the above analysis depicts little knowledge about how the monetary policy makers will 
react on day to day to avoid too much money or to increase the money supply within the 
economy. The best response then is to look at other inflation indicators and the policy variables. 
The synchronization of all the inflation indicators would make it possible to deter inflation as 
these indicators need to be constantly monitored to allow constant and stable inflation. 
Conclusively, money supply should only rise according to the growth of the supply of goods and 
services in the economy. This easy rule will preserve the purchasing power of money, as well as 
its traditional functions as the universal means of payment, store of value and unit of account. 
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2.5.2 Exchange rates  
 
Exchange rates in South Africa have exhibited episodes of extreme volatility in the past 
impacting the economy. The exchange rate is the price of one unit of domestic currency in terms 
of a foreign currency or a weighted-average of foreign currencies. The exchange rate is a 
financial variable used by many central banks as a guide for monetary policy. Market forces 
determine the exchange rate of the rand in South Africa. For instance, buying and selling rates 
for Rands quoted by authorized foreign exchange dealers determine the supply of and demand 
for Rands in the market at any given time. It should be known that whatever is happening 
internationally matters in the local economy. The local financial markets are increasingly 
integrated with those abroad. Shocks, surprises and policy decisions elsewhere are reflected in 
the local markets instantly.  
When the exchange rate is floating, a policy-led cut in the interest rate leads to capital outflows 
and a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. With sticky prices, this may lead to a real 
depreciation and an increase in the price of tradables relative to non-tradables. Commonly the 
exchange rate channel plays an important role in emerging market economies for several reasons. 
First, the influence of the exchange rate on demand in small open economies tends to be large. 
Second, the exchange rate often constitutes a key variable for private sector expectations about 
inflation. Third, exchange rate changes produce large balance sheet effects in those economies 
where households and firms have foreign currency assets and liabilities.  
Monetary policy in South Africa will inevitably be influenced by and have to react to 
developments abroad. A decline in the foreign exchange value of the domestic currency shown 
by a depreciation of the domestic currency could indicate that the risks of higher inflation have 
increased (Kozicki, S., 2001). A depreciation of a currency could indicate that domestic 
monetary policy has become more accommodative and this leads to increases in domestic 
demand and inflationary pressures. A depreciation of the Rand leads to increased foreign demand 
for domestically produced goods and services through increased exports of goods and increased 
tourism and higher import prices each of which may lead to higher domestic inflation.  
 According to Mboweni, T. T., (2000), the exchange rates reflect differences in economic 
activity and may not be good predictors of inflation. This is due to the fact that a depreciation of 
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the Rand may indicate a weaker foreign growth and possible result to reduced foreign demand 
for goods and decreased inflationary pressures. The main purpose of exchange control is to 
ensure the timeous repatriation into the South African banking system of certain foreign currency 
acquired by residents of South Africa. Another reason is to prevent the loss of foreign-currency 
resources through the transfer abroad of real or financial capital assets held in South Africa 
(Bruce, B., 2006). High rate of inflation causes severe fluctuations in exchange rates and this 
adversely affects trade i.e. exports and imports, important business transaction across borders 
and the value of money also changes. In an environment of high capital mobility, exchange rate 
pegs suffer from fragile credibility and serve as poor substitutes for sound domestic 
macroeconomic policymaking (Mukherjee, B., and Singer. A. D., 2008). 
Conclusively, the relationship between a country’s exchange rate and economic growth is a 
crucial issue from both the descriptive and policy prescription perspectives. The main reason is 
that the international business environment has no universal medium of exchange and therefore 
the exchange rates are necessities for international trade. Currently the translation and conversion 
of foreign currency involve the use of exchange rates. Therefore, the role of exchange rates 
towards the alteration of inflation should be of great significance if well forecasted as this will 
reduce inflation rates. It is important to examine the exchange rates and the critical role they play 
in the international economy in holding inflation to low levels. For example, exchange rate 
movements have a direct effect, though often delayed, on the domestic prices of imported goods 
and services, and an indirect effect on the prices of those goods and services that compete with 
imports or use imported inputs, and hence on the component of overall inflation that is imported. 
2.5.2.1 South Africa’s trends in the exchange rate 
 
The history of the exchange rates in South Africa stems back from the nineteenth century when 
people exchanged beads, cloth and other valuable goods like gold.  From August, 1989, under a 
Governor Stals, the South African Reserve Bank appeared to be active in stabilising the real 
effective exchange rate partly out of concern for the international competitiveness of South 
Africa's manufacturing exports. This aimed to prevent excessive appreciation of the real 
exchange rate when the nominal exchange rate was tending to appreciate. There was, however, 
no explicit official policy to stabilise the real exchange rate. 
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Political uncertainty after 1992 began to put increased pressure on the exchange rate. In the 
uncertain atmosphere prior to the elections of April, 1994, there were huge capital outflows. 
Despite borrowing from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and significantly increasing 
other short-term foreign borrowing, the SARB was unable to prevent a real effective depreciation 
of close to 10 percent between January, 1993 and July, 1994 (nominal depreciation was about 19 
percent). After the election, capital inflows resumed strongly, particularly when exchange 
controls on foreign investors were lifted with the unification of the dual exchange rate system in 
March, 1995. There was heavy intervention in both spot and forward markets to prevent 
appreciation of the rand, at the expense of monetary targets (Stals, October, 1995).  
 
Continued disturbances in other emerging market economies and noneconomic disturbances in 
other parts of sub-Saharan Africa led to the depreciation of the real effective exchange rate of the 
rand in 2000. A highly volatile political situation in Zimbabwe and the sharp changes in the gold 
price have inevitably had a significant effect on the exchange rates of the rand with sharp 
declines normally leading to a depreciation of the rand. Terrorist attacks on America in 
September 2001 further raised concerns about investments in emerging market economies and 
the real effective exchange rate of the rand declined (depreciated) by 9 per cent in 2001. 
Measured against the US dollar, the rand depreciated by 6.2 per cent in the first half of 2001 and 
by a further 33.3 per cent in the second half of 2001, but this was not unique to the rand. 
Currencies of other emerging market economies such as Brazil and Turkey also lost their ground 
against the US dollar (SARB, 2001: 47 and 2002: 48). 
The period from 2002-2008 was characterized by positive investor sentiment, a rise in 
international commodity prices and a relatively healthy balance of payments which all 
contributed to the recovery of the rand (see Figure 7.21 showing the South African exchange rate 
graph for the period under study). 
In any given economy, the changes in exchange rates are important in the determination of 
monetary policy because they have an impact on inflation. In South Africa, the exchange rates 
have an impact on prices, price competitiveness, output and resource allocation. On the other 
hand, highly indebted developing countries are vulnerable to exchange rate movements if their 
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debts are denominated mainly in foreign currencies. A substantial depreciation of a domestic 
currency in the case where the domestic country have debt denominated in foreign currency may 
lead to a financial crisis. 
Conclusively, exchange rate changes affect inflation, aggregate demand, economic growth, 
employment creation and income distribution. Monetary policy makers therefore need to closely 
monitor exchange rate developments to make the right decision as changes in the exchange rates 
have a greater impact in the whole economy.  In South Africa, inflation target is specified in 
terms of retail price inflation excluding mortgage interest payments. It is simply the weighted 
average of domestic inflation and imported inflation. Imported inflation is inflation of the 
domestic currency price of imported goods and services which is strongly influenced by real 
exchange rate movements. Given the large real appreciation of Rand and falls in world 
commodity prices, the imported component of South Africa’s inflation is negative resulting in 
overall inflation not to fall below target. Therefore, domestically generated inflation is 
significantly above the target level and been the source of inflation rate being out (above) of the 
targeted range. A central question that has to be asked for South Africa monetary policy is 
whether domestically generated inflation can be brought down in time for overall inflation to 
stay on target once the temporary restraining influence of external factors wears off.  
 
2.5.3 Employment rate 
 
The unemployment rate is the number of people available for work but currently without work 
taken as a percentage of the economically active population that includes both the employed and 
the unemployed. Inflation tends to increase when the unemployment rate is falling and inflation 
tends to decrease when the unemployment rate is rising (Kozicki, S., 2001). The Phillips curve is 
used to capture a tradeoff between unemployment and wage or price inflation. The intuition 
behind the Phillips curve is that low unemployment rates usually signal tight labor market 
conditions. Tight labor market conditions bring larger wage increases that might be passed on to 
higher prices and therefore low unemployment rates are expected to predict increasing inflation. 
Phillips (1958) found a stable relationship between wage inflation and the unemployment rate 
using data for the United Kingdom over the period 1861 to 1957. The flip side of this story is 
that high unemployment rates reflect an excess supply of workers and puts downward pressures 
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on wages and prices. Growth of a nation depends to a large extent on employment. If rate of 
inflation is high, unemployment rate is low and vice versa. This theory is propounded by 
economist William Philips and this gave rise to the Philips Curve. Despite the many criticisms of 
the Phillips curve, many analysts continue to use versions of Phillips curves to predict inflation. 
While most analysts focus on the level of the unemployment rate as a predictor of inflation 
changes, Phillips also suggested that the change in the unemployment rate might help predict 
inflation changes. 
 
South Africa has an extreme and persistent high unemployment rate, which interacts with other 
economic and social problems such as inadequate education, poor health outcomes and crime. 
The unemployment rate has fuelled crime, inequality and social unrest. The global economic 
downturn has made the problem worse, wiping out more than a million jobs. Some experts 
contend that higher wages negotiated by politically powerful trade unions have suppressed job 
growth, while some studies found that the shrinking of the manufacturing sector rooted in 
structural problems such as South Africa's history of apartheid was more to blame for rising 
unemployment and low growth. Rising unemployment may curb consumer spending which 
accounts for two-thirds of demand in the South African economy. 
 
The demand for labour is a derived demand and it is dependent on the consumer demand for the 
product or service produced by that labour. The demand for labour will be influenced by the 
price of labour which impacts on the price of the product or service and by the changes in the 
demand for the service or product. Furthermore, it will be influenced by factors like the market 
value of the product and how much of the product is produced by the labour. The theoretical 
relationship between the demand of labour and the price of labour is the wage rate. 
 
Conclusively, the level of demand relative to domestic supply capacity in the labour market and 
elsewhere is a key influence on domestic inflationary pressure. For example, if demand for 
labour exceeds the supply available, there will tend to be upward pressure on wage increases, 
which some firms may be able to pass through into higher prices charged to consumers. 
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2.5.4 Output growth  
 
Output growth is a measure of real economic activity that might predict inflation. Strong real 
economic activity is usually associated with strong growth in aggregate demand. It is argued that 
strong growth in aggregate demand indicates that inflation will likely increase. Frictions 
associated with expansion of productive capital imply that generally strong output growth may 
indicate a pickup in inflationary pressures. Increasing production to meet increasing demand at 
minimal cost generally requires increases in both capital and labor inputs. However, adjusting 
some forms of new productive capital, such as building new plants or assembling and installing 
new equipment typically takes time. Increases in employment will imply increased income to 
workers and stronger consumer demand.  
 
Although strong economic growth may be an imperfect indicator of increasing inflation, it is 
essential to put it into consideration when predicting inflation. Strong growth due to a positive 
supply shock such as an increase in trend labor productivity growth is unlikely to signal an 
increase in inflation (Kozicki, S., 2001). Increased immigration and faster population growth 
lead to stronger sustainable rates of economic growth without increased inflationary pressures. In 
theory, a number of these potential indicators might be expected to predict inflation and whether 
it is helpful to use these indicators depends on how well they actually predict inflation.  
 
2.5.5 Gold prices  
 
Using data for 14 countries over the 1994 to 2005 period, Tkacz, G., (2007) assessed the leading 
indicator properties of gold at horizons ranging from 6 to 24 months. The author found that gold 
contains significant information for future inflation for several countries, especially for those that 
have adopted formal inflation targets. The findings arouse from the manner in which inflation 
expectations are formed in these countries, which may result in more rapidly mean-reverting 
inflation rates. In conclusion, the author found that in Canada, gold remains statistically 
significant inflation indicator variable when combined with variables such as the output gap or 
the growth rate of a broad monetary aggregate. 
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Since 1886 South Africa has been the focal source of gold production in the world. Since then, 
South Africa has literally dominated the global gold panorama. At its peak production in 1970 
South Africa contributed 79% of the world's annual supply of the noble yellow gold. Its 
dominant position has decreased in the last 27 years in total gold production, followed by the 
North-America and a distant third Australia. Today, South African gold mines supply about 25% 
of the world's yearly production. However, its diminished production dominance is primarily due 
to vast gold discoveries primarily in North-America and Australia. Nonetheless, South Africa 
continues to rule unchallenged in the in more important category of gold reserves. Moreover, a 
recent manpower reduction and rationalization drive has resulted in major cost reductions 
throughout the South African industry. Average costs after capital expenditure are now lower in 
South Africa than North-American mines. Despite having hedged their production at much lower 
prices than North-American mines, South Africans are now reporting good profits even at low 
prevailing gold prices. 
 
Gold is traded continuously throughout the world based on the intra-day spot price derived from 
over-the-counter gold-trading markets around the world. Like most commodities, the price of 
gold is driven by supply and demand as well as speculation. However unlike most other 
commodities, saving and disposal plays a larger role in affecting its price than its consumption. 
Gold mining is one of the South Africa's biggest private sector employers. In 2004, South 
Africa's gold production fell by 8.8 percent to 342.7 tons, the lowest since 1931. This was due to 
the strong South African Rand's impact on domestic gold prices and rising costs. Gold mining 
companies warned job cuts due to the rand eroding export earnings.  
 
Gold anticipates the rise and fall in purchasing power of a currency. Theoretically, the use of 
gold prices as a guide for the direction of monetary policy relies upon the argument that prices 
are determined in flexible markets with forward-looking expectations. Therefore gold prices can 
quickly incorporate events and news which might affect the expected inflation rate. The long 
disinflationary era of the 1980s and 1990s saw a declining trend in both consumer price inflation 
and the gold price. The price of gold does a good job of reflecting the inflationary environment 
as measured by the Consumer Price Index. It is certainly a better indicator than the crude oil 
price. Research by the late Professor Roy Jastram (University of California - Berkeley) suggests 
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that gold maintains its purchasing power over the centuries. After investigating the purchasing 
power of gold over the past 300 years, Jastram concluded that, despite major inflations and 
deflations, gold maintains its purchasing power over long periods of time, for example, half-
century intervals. Most studies have also included the price of gold in their analysis (Garner, A., 
1995). The price of gold is viewed by some analysts as a leading indicator of inflation because 
gold is widely held as a store of value. Gold is a store of value partly because of its physical 
characteristics such as durability and attractiveness and partly because of its historical role as the 
centerpiece of the world monetary system.  
 
According to Garner, A., (1995), though gold no longer plays a key role in the world monetary 
system, the price of gold might be a good leading indicator of inflation. The rationale is that if 
enough people regard gold as a good store of value, the expectation of rising inflation could 
cause some investors to shift their funds out of financial assets with fixed nominal interest rates 
into gold coins or jewellery. Due to the reason that gold supply is relatively fixed, the price of 
gold might rise sharply with even a small increase in demand. The general inflation rate, in 
contrast, tends to rise more slowly because the prices of many goods and services adjust 
sluggishly. As a result, an increase in the price of gold might precede an increase in the general 
inflation rate provided the expectation of rising inflation was correct in the first place. 
 
In conclusion, the price of gold is essential in the determination of inflation and is also 
characterized by a close relationship with interest rates. It is commonly accepted that interest 
rates are closely related to the price of gold. As interest rates rise the general tendency is for the 
gold price, which earns no interest, to fall, and as rates dip, for gold price to rise. As a result, 
gold price can be closely correlated to central banks via the monetary policy decisions made by 
them related to interest rates. For example if market signals indicate the possibility of prolonged 
inflation, central banks may decide to enact policies such as a hike in interest rates that could 
affect the price of gold in order to quell the inflation. 
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2.5.6 Oil prices  
 
Oil prices pose a challenge to economic policy in South Africa. The ruinous effect of rampant oil 
prices affects the rate of inflation and the economy at large. Oil prices must be managed in such 
a way that they do not amplify cyclical fluctuations. It should be recognized that given the 
important role of oil in the operation of the national economy, once oil prices rise, there would 
be a domino effect which not only directly promotes domestic energy price increases but also has 
a pushing up effect on domestic prices by increasing industrial production costs. This means that 
solely quantifying the effect of oil prices on the measure of inflation is to the criticism that 
second round effects are ignored. Second round effects refer to the situation where oil price 
increases lead to general inflation in other sectors of the economy through increased production 
costs. 
Oil price shocks lead to increases in wages and prices and decreases in real output. Inflation has 
been on the rise in developed economies following persistent increases in the prices of oil and 
agricultural commodities. The impact of oil prices on inflation, in particular, has re-emerged as a 
key macroeconomic issue in any given economy and the world at large due to integration 
between countries. The price of oil and inflation are often seen as being connected in a cause and 
effect relationship. As oil prices move up or down, inflation follows in the same direction. The 
reason why this happens is that oil is a major input in the economy and it is used in critical 
activities such as fuelling transportation and heating homes. Therefore, if input costs rise, so 
should the cost of end products.  
 
According to Bermingham, C., (2009), the unpredictable behaviour and wild swings in the price 
of oil makes the rate of inflation forecasting more difficult due to the fact that oil is a key 
determinant of the price of many goods in the consumer basket. Any changes in oil prices will 
impact on inflation directly. 
 
In terms of forecasting the impact of rising oil prices on inflation, there is one potential 
complication in the sense that commodity prices, such as food, have also witnessed considerable 
increases. Using standard approaches, it is difficult to disentangle which part of an increase in 
inflation is due to higher oil prices and which part is due to higher food prices (Bermingham, C., 
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2009). To address this problem, the research will focus only on the energy component of overall 
inflation in the estimates. Clearly, food price increases are not going to impact on the energy 
component of inflation so any estimates of the impact of higher oil prices on the energy 
component are not capturing higher food prices. In addition, the energy component that will be 
used in the paper excludes regulated prices so that the series under examination represents the 
prices of the purely market-driven components of energy. 
 
2.5.7 Interest rates 
 
Central banks conduct monetary policy by setting or targeting an overnight interest rate or 
another short-term rate. Increases in these interest rates are commonly regarded as tightening of 
monetary conditions and are expected to slow economic activity and decrease inflationary 
pressures (Kozicki, S., 2001). Decreases in these rates are easings of monetary conditions and are 
expected to improve real economic activity and possibly increase inflationary pressures. Interest 
rates are not, however, a clear signal of the stance of monetary police due to the fact that interest 
rates contain an expected inflation component and a real interest rate component. According to 
Smal, M. M., and Jager, S., (2001), the repurchase rate (repo) system was introduced on the 9
th
 
of March 1998 in an effort to ensure that financial instruments become more flexible and that 
interest rates would react more quickly and sensitively to the periodic changes in the underlying 
financial market conditions. The repo rate system was considered far more transparent through 
the regular disclosure of the amount of liquidity that the Central Bank is prepared to make 
available on a daily tendering basis to the banking institutions. The most important signal is the 
amount of liquidity provided by the Central Bank. A specific value of a short-term interest rate 
may reflect relatively tight monetary policy if expected inflation is low or relatively 
accommodative monetary policy if expected inflation is high. For a similar reason, rising interest 
rates may not indicate a tightening of monetary policy and falling interest rates may not indicate 
an easing of policy. For example, if expected inflation increases by more than an increase in 
interest rates, then policy might be viewed as less tight.  
 
According to Kozicki, S., (2001), the control of expected inflation using real interest rates as a 
potential indicator of future inflation is crucial. Real interest rates which are constructed as 
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nominal interest rates less expected inflation do not suffer from the difficulties associated with 
the expected inflation component of nominal interest rates. As a result, short-term real interest 
rates may provide a better measure of the stance of monetary policy and, therefore, may be a 
better predictor of inflation than nominal interest rates.  
 
In practice, real interest rates may be an imperfect indicator of future inflation. The level of real 
rates consistent with flat inflation/the equilibrium real rate may change over time. Thus, an 
increase in real interest rates may not reflect a tightening of monetary policy if the equilibrium 
real rate also increases. Thus the real interest rate gap potentially has stronger leading indicator 
properties than other potential inflation indicators like the output gap. In models where the 
output gap responds to the real interest rate gap with a lag, and inflation reacts to the output gap 
gradually, the real interest rate gap gives advance information about both the output gap and 
inflation (Katharine, S. N. and Edward, N., 2003). 
 
The spread between a long-term interest rate and a short-term interest rate as a measure of the 
stance of monetary policy can also be used as an approach to controlling expected inflation.  
Since long-term interest rates move with changes in expected inflation, they are often regarded 
as a reasonable benchmark to control for the level of expected inflation. When monetary policy 
is tightened, short-term interest rates rise. Although long-term interest rates may react to policy, 
they rarely rise one-for-one with short-term interest rate increases. As a result, the spread usually 
falls when monetary policy is tightened, indicating a likely decrease in future inflation.  
 
Long-term interest rates may as well help predict inflation on their own. The nominal long-term 
interest rates incorporate market expectations of inflation over a long horizon. An increase in the 
market’s expectation of inflation, all else equal, will lead to an increase in long-term interest 
rates. As a result, if market expectations of inflation are correct on average, changes in long-term 
interest rates may signal a change in future inflation in the same direction. Movements in long-
term interest rates may, however, occur without changes in expected inflation. Such shifts draw 
into question the predictive power of long-term interest rates and interest rate spreads for future 
inflation. For instance, long-term interest rates contain liquidity premiums that may rise when 
market participants become more uncertain about the outlook for interest rates. Additionally, 
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long-term rates may shift with changes in the relative supply and demand for long maturity 
securities. 
  
Theoretically, Keynes’ general theory argued that uncertainty has a major economic impact. 
Driving people to store their wealth in ways with more stable returns increases the demand for 
cash and decreases the demand for investments. This does not only drive down investments in 
this direct way but the increased demand for cash leads to higher interest rates and hence people 
are driven out of investment into bonds. During an economic downturn, the demand for credit 
tends to slow down. A policy of open market purchases of government securities by the Reserve 
Bank can increase the supply of funds or reserves to banks. Such a policy would tend to lower 
interest rates and stimulate borrowing and spending. This leads to higher levels of production, 
employment and income. Generally, a rise in prices and expectations of worsening inflation tend 
to drive up the general level of interest rates, while a slowing of inflation and an improvement in 
the inflationary outlook generally lead to a lower level of interest rates. 
 
Conclusively, the repo rate has direct effects most of the variables in the economy such as other 
interest rates, the exchange rate, money and credit other asset prices and decisions on spending 
and investment. Overall, the changes in the repo rate therefore affect the demand for and supply 
of goods and services. The official interest rate decisions affect market interest rates such as 
mortgage rates and bank deposit rates to varying degrees. At the same time, policy actions and 
announcements affect expectations about the future course of the economy and the confidence 
with which these expectations are held, as well as affecting asset prices and the exchange rate. 
These changes in turn affect the spending, saving and investment behaviour of individuals and 
firms in the economy. For example, other things being equal, higher interest rates tend to 
encourage saving rather than spending, and a higher value of Rand in foreign exchange markets, 
which makes foreign goods less expensive relative to goods produced at home. So changes in the 
official interest rate affect the demand for goods and services produced in the South Africa. 
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2.6 Monetary policy transmission mechanism in South Africa 
 
The monetary policy transmission mechanism illustrates how the Central Bank’s current and 
expected policy actions are directly transmitted to asset markets and money. The changes in 
these markets in turn affect good and labour markets and ultimately the prices and aggregate 
output. An example of monetary policy instrument that can be used is the repo rate. The repo rate 
has direct effects on other variables in the economy and these includes variables like money and 
credit, the exchange rate and other asset prices leading to changes in decisions on investment, 
spending and saving behaviour of individuals and firms. In South Africa, the monetary 
transmission mechanism (MTM) involves the interest rates channel, the exchange rate channel 
and the credit channel. Firstly, the interest rate channel uses the real interest rates to influence the 
aggregate demand and finally influence price stability/inflation. A rise in the repo rates by the 
SARB will subsequently lead to an increase in the short-term real interest rate. This quickly 
influence firms and individuals to change their spending and investing behaviour. Higher real 
interest rates reduce consumer spending and investment spending ultimately leading to lower 
inflation (Mishkin, F. S., 2004).  
 
Secondly, the exchange rate channel influences inflation through its effects on net exports (NX). 
When the SARB increases the repo rate, short term real rates also increase causing the Rand to 
strengthen. This is because Rand denominated deposits become more attractive compared to 
foreign currency deposits. This results in capital inflow and increased demand for the Rand 
causing the Rand to strengthen. In this case, the domestic goods becomes relatively more 
expensive to foreigners and foreign goods relatively cheaper for domestic importers resulting in 
a decrease in net exports (NX) and consequently aggregate demand and inflation (Mishkin, F. S., 
2004). 
According to Mishkin, F. S., (2004), the credit channel refers to the transmission mechanism that 
affects aggregate demand hence inflation by influencing credit issued institutions. The bank 
lending channel and the balance sheet channel are the two examples of the credit channel. The 
bank lending channel is a restrictive monetary policy that causes the bank reserves and bank 
deposits to decrease resulting in a decrease in the quantity of bank loans available to economic 
agents. This reduces consumer investment and spending and reduces aggregate demand and 
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inflation. The balance sheet channel is made effective due to imperfect information inherent in 
credit institutions. Restrictive monetary policy causes stock prices to decline because the public 
have less money available to invest in stocks. Conclusively, the monetary transmission 
mechanism (MTM) with the forward looking nature of inflation targeting have a great impact on 
price stability and low inflation. 
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Chapter 3 
 
3.0 Literature review 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
A number of studies have investigated both theoretically and empirically an assessment of 
inflation targeting framework as a monetary policy regime. This ranges from different 
methodology like Traditional Taylor rule (TTR) and some style rules which are different. Best 
rules were selected by both the Fisher test and the information criteria in some of the studies 
whereby the estimation methods depended on the result of the exogeneity, autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity. Some of papers discuss the issues of inflation targeting in developing 
countries, why it works and how to make it work better, conditions for successful inflation 
targeting, the reasons why these countries switch to inflation targeting regime, and the extent to 
which these conditions are satisfied in developing and developed countries. Others evaluate 
inflation targeting as a monetary policy strategy in particular countries by offering empirical 
models to assess the feasibility of inflation targeting in these countries. Some studies have been 
carried out to evaluate inflation indicators in different countries to check whether the root to 
inflation going out of the range is as a result of failure to incorporate the indicators very well. 
Different inflation indicators have been used for different countries in the process of evaluation. 
3.2 Theoretical literature review 
 
The academic literature contains a lot of theoretical work on inflation. Many theories have been 
developed and used in guarding the escalation of prices to achieve price stability. These theories 
include the quantity theory of money, Keynesian theory, monetarism, the rationale expectations 
and structuralism. 
Monetary economists believe in the quantity theory of money, the class of theories that imply 
that inflation rates can be controlled by controlling the rate of growth of the money supply only. 
This relationship is presented using the quantity equation (MV=PY) which was observed 
previously under the study on money supply. MV = PY, where: M is the stock of money in 
circulation, V is the velocity of circulation, P is the general price level, Y is the total income. 
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Assuming that the velocity of money and the level of production are stable, an increase in money 
supply would lead to an increase in prices. This states that there will be a proportionate positive 
relationship between the money supply and the price levels of a given economy. That is, when 
the money supply increases by a certain percentage the price levels will also increase by an equal 
percentage. 
Monetarists believe the most significant factor influencing inflation or deflation is how fast the 
money supply grows or shrinks. They consider fiscal policy, or government spending and 
taxation, as ineffective in controlling inflation. Monetarists assert that the empirical study of 
monetary history shows that inflation has always been a monetary phenomenon. The quantity 
theory of money, simply stated, says that any change in the amount of money in a system will 
change the price level. According to Mishkin, F. S., (2006), monetary targeting involves the 
reliance on information conveyed by a monetary aggregate to conduct monetary policy, the 
announcement of medium-term targets for monetary aggregates, and some accountability 
mechanism to prevent large, systematic deviations from the monetary targets. Monetarists 
assume that the velocity of money is unaffected by monetary policy in the long run and that the 
real value of output is determined in the long run by the productive capacity of the economy.  
Conclusively, the monetarists use the idea that velocity is relatively unaffected by monetary 
policy therefore the long-run rate of increase in prices (the inflation rate) is equal to the long run 
growth rate of the money supply plus the exogenous long-run rate of velocity growth minus the 
long run growth rate of real output. A monetarist believes increases in the money supply will 
only influence or increase production and employment levels in the short run and not in the long 
run. Accordingly, there will be a positive relationship between inflation levels and money 
supply. The monetarists explain this relationship using the theory of natural rate of 
unemployment.  The theory of natural rate of unemployment suggests that there will be a level of 
equilibrium output, employment, and corresponding level of unemployment naturally decided 
based on features such as resources employment, technology used and the number of firms in the 
country etc, the unemployment level decided in this manner will be identified as natural rate of 
unemployment. In the short run, expansionary monetary policies will result in the decline in the 
natural rate of unemployment and increase the production but the effectiveness of the 
expansionary policies will be limited in the long run and lead to an inflationary situation. 
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Robert Lucas launched the rational expectations revolution which demonstrates that the public 
and the markets’ expectations of policy actions have important effects on every sector of the 
economy. The theory of rational expectations makes it clear the reason why there could be no 
long-run trade-off between unemployment and inflation. It states that attempt to lower 
unemployment below the natural rate would lead only to higher inflation and no improvement in 
performance in output or employment. Rational expectations theory holds that economic actors 
look rationally into the future when trying to maximize their well-being and do not respond 
solely to immediate opportunity costs and pressures. In this view, while generally grounded in 
monetarism, future expectations and strategies are important for inflation as well. The central 
banks must establish credibility in fighting inflation or economic actors will push the central 
bank to expand the money supply rapidly enough to prevent recession, even at the expense of 
exacerbating inflation. 
Keynesian economists emphasize the role of aggregate demand in the economy rather than the 
money supply in determining inflation. That is, for Keynesians, the money supply is only one 
determinant of aggregate demand. In the Keynesian view, prices and wages adjust at different 
rates and these differences have enough effects on real output to be long term in the view of 
people in an economy. Keynesian economic theory proposes that changes in money supply do 
not directly affect prices, and that visible inflation is the result of pressures in the economy 
expressing themselves in prices. The supply of money is a major, but not the only, cause of 
inflation. According to Keynes an increase in general price levels or inflation is created by an 
increase in the aggregate demand which is over and above the increase in aggregate supply. If a 
given economy is at its full employment output level, an increase in government expenditure (G), 
an increase in private consumption (C) and an increase in private investment (I) will create an 
increase in aggregate demand, leading towards an increase in general price levels. Such an 
inflationary situation is created due to the fact that at optimum or full employment of output 
(maximum utilization of scarce resources) a given economy is unable to increase its output or 
aggregate supply in response to an increase in aggregate demand. 
In an inflation targeting framework, expectations play an important role in containing inflation 
rate figure at a certain range/point via, for example, publicity in press release. According to 
Bernanke, B. S. and Mishkin, F. S., (1997), the Central Bank must publish regular, detailed 
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assessments of the inflation situation, including current forecasts of inflation and discussions of 
the policy response that is needed to keep inflation on track. In many familiar models of 
monetary policy today, if the central bank takes actions that do not affect expectations, those 
actions simply do not matter. All that matters is that whatever the Central Bank does affect 
expectations which is just what inflation targeting is intended to do. In other words the operating 
arm of monetary policy is not the trading desk but the press office. Therefore, for the SARB to 
enjoy credibility, the press release is essential to let the public know of their intended purpose to 
keep inflation straight and narrow so that the public believes in these monetary policy stance.  In 
the case where inflation is already a bit higher than desired, but the Central Bank cuts interest 
rates so as to spur the real economy out of a recession and it claims that the sole purpose of these 
actions is to preserve price stability, stability can be achieved. Conclusively, the publication of 
inflation forecasts and current macroeconomic conditions by the central bank strengthens the 
public’s ability to monitor the central bank’s policy decisions. 
The backing theory/anti-classical theory argues that the value of money is determined by the 
assets and liabilities of the issuing agency. Classical economics recalls supply-side theories, 
which emphasise the need for incentives to save and invest if the nation's economy is to grow, 
linking it to land, capital and labour. The foundation for Classical growth model was laid by 
Adam Smith who posited a supply side driven model of growth with the following production 
function: 
Y = f (L, K, T) 
Where Y is output, L is labour, K is capital and T is land. This means that output was related to 
labour, capital and land inputs. Unlike the quantity theory of classical political economy, the 
backing theory argues that issuing authorities can issue money without causing inflation so long 
as the money issuer have sufficient assets to cover redemptions.  
Structuralism theory states that the main reason for inflation is the in-elasticity in the structures 
of the economy. This theory is mainly used to explain the nature and basis of inflation in 
developing countries. Originating in Latin America, this theory states that the inflation rates in 
developing countries are affected by the in-elasticity of the following reasons; production level 
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and capacity, capital formulation, institutional framework, high in-elasticity in the agricultural 
sector, in-elasticity of the labour force and employment structures. 
In conclusion, the above theories have been propounded by different economists at different 
times to suit for certain conditions affecting the economy and have been successful in achieving 
price stability and low inflation. For example, a consensus has been reached by many scholars 
that monetary policy cannot be used to stimulate output and reduce unemployment beyond the 
sustainable levels. If the monetarist uses expansionary monetary policy to reduce unemployment 
or increase output, this will result in high inflation and persistent lower unemployment or output. 
Since then, the use of indicators of inflation as tools to control inflation have become an eye-
opener to many economists to be able to control and follow trends in these indicator variables in 
order to achieve stability in prices. 
3.3 Empirical literature review 
 
The prominent leading indicators of inflation in South Africa includes the price of gold, the 
exchange rates, the employment rates, the interest rates, the total output, the money supply (M3) 
and the price of oil. The leading indicators typically incorporate information on selected prices to 
augment or replace information on economic slack. The prices selected are usually key 
commodity prices that fluctuate more or less continuously in response to changing economic 
conditions. Most often someone may expect inflation to increase or to drop and may base these 
expectations through various approaches besides the use of inflation indicators to forecasting 
inflation. An approach based on the different economic theory can be used to forecast the rate of 
inflation. For example, one can use the approach via a forecast of inflation by a mere analysis of 
situations where production exceeds capacity constraints. This view is explained by Garner, A. 
C., (1995) and stipulates that measures of economic slack such as unemployment and capacity 
utilization can provide useful information about the inflation outlook.  
 
The SARB have tried lowering the inflation figure but its values of inflation are still outside the 
Reserve Bank's inflation target band of 3 – 6% although it has been successful in some instances. 
This might be a result of supply shocks to the economy such as oil price movements that could 
require very large monetary-policy adjustments to bring inflation back inside the target range 
within the stated time horizon. Another reason for failure to meet the inflation target might be the 
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failure to use and incorporate inflation indicators. Research done by Cecchetti, S. G., et al., 
(1995) reviewed that indicators must not be used in isolation as they can provide a limited 
predictive power. He further argued that the real variables such as unemployment, prices of gold 
and oil are correlated with inflation at horizons of 1 or 2 years, but not at horizons of 3 to 4 
years.  
 
According to research done by Cecchetti, S. G., Steindel, C. and Chu, R., (2000), the forecasts 
based on indicators in the United States proved to be less reliable than those produced by using a 
well-known econometric model or by averaging the predictions of a panel of business 
economists. These researchers argued that the indicator variables in combination produce 
reasonably good forecasts and that simple models based on single indicators fail to yield 
consistently useful information. Out of the nineteen indicators, only ten were consistently worse 
at forecasting inflation. They deduced that increases in commodity prices precede future declines 
in inflation. For example, an increase in price of oil by a dollar was associated with a drop in the 
annual rate of inflation of 0.22 percentage points after four quarters. The following set of 
inflation indicators were used to achieve the results. 
 
“Journal of Commerce price index for industrial materials growth, Journal of Commerce price 
index for industrial materials level, National Association of Purchasing Management price 
diffusion index, Price of gold, Price of oil, West Texas Intermediate Exchange rate trade-
weighted U.S. dollar against basket of Group of Ten currencies  growth, Exchange rate-trade-
weighted U.S. dollar against basket of Group of Ten currencies level, Monetary base growth-
M1, growth,M2, growth, Federal funds rate, Spread between the interest rate on the ten-year 
Treasury bond and the federal funds rate, Spread between the prime commercial paper rate and 
the federal funds rate, Index of weekly hours worked in private nonfarm business growth, 
National Association of Purchasing Management composite index of manufacturing activity, 
Capacity utilization rate, Unemployment rate, Employment-to-population ratio, Average hourly 
earnings in private nonfarm business growth”. Cecchetti, S. G., (1995). 
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In this research, different variables that are indicators of inflation to the South African economy 
will be incorporated and an evaluation will be made with regard to their relationship with the rate 
of inflation.  
 
Research done by Christoffersen, P. F. and Wescott, R. F., (1999) examined the statistical 
linkages between monetary policy instruments and inflation. Inflation indicators were analysed 
and conclusions drawn by using one of the econometric methods of data evaluation. The Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) tests were used and the results were not satisfactory for using one variable than 
incorporating all the variables. It was noted that including more than one lag the power of the 
ADF tests dropped and the null hypothesis was not rejected. This signifies that incorporating 
more variables could yield better results. The results stated that there is a reasonable linkage 
between the exchange rate and the inflation measures and that there is some evidence movements 
in broad money that may influence certain representation of inflation. These relationships were 
predicted to be strong and tight by using the Bivariate Granger Tests. A range of inflation 
indicators were used and these includes monetary aggregates, interest rates, the exchange rates, 
real activity variables, labour market variables, foreign price indices and other financial market 
variables. 
 
Research done by Kozicki, S., (2001) in the United States using five indicators of inflation 
(interest rates, Output, Exchange rates, money supply (M3) and unemployment) concludes that 
no single economic indicator is always reliable. This evidence supports an approach to 
policymaking that involves monitoring a wide range of economic indicators. The author also 
found that results might differ in prediction of inflation depending with the monetary policy 
procedures, economic experiences and economic structure across each country on observation. 
Kozicki deduced that indicators based on nominal interest rate levels perform poorly although 
other interest rate indicators perform very well. On the other hand, unemployment rate predicted 
inflation very well. 
  
Marques et al., (2002), using United States data from the period 1983/1 to 2000/12 (18 years of 
monthly data) found that the “excluding food and energy” indicator is not an attractor of 
inflation. Their study found that the trimmed mean and the weighted median are weakly 
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exogenous and are leading inflation indicators in United States. The excluding food and energy 
indicator was found to be a lagging rather than a leading inflation indicator. The authors 
concluded that the trimmed mean and the weighted median constitute useful core inflation 
indicators to be used by analysts or by the Central Bank in the assessment of recent price 
developments and in the analysis of the risks for future price stability. This was not, however, the 
case of the ‘excluding food and energy’ indicator, which behaved as a lagging rather than as a 
leading indicator of inflation. 
Armour, J., (2006) did a statistical evaluation of various measures of core inflation for Canada  
focusing on the inflation-targeting period from 1992 to 2003. The author used the following 
measures: lack of bias, low variability relative to total CPI inflation, and ability to forecast actual 
and trend total CPI inflation in the evaluation process. Armour found that although the traditional 
statistical measures of core inflation do satisfy properties useful for an operational measure of 
target inflation and that their usefulness is nevertheless limited, the measures were less volatile 
than total CPI and provide limited information to help predict total CPI inflation. However, 
Armour also found that these measures are not immune to temporary relative price shocks 
meaning monitoring several different measures of core inflation should help economists to 
understand the various shocks hitting the economy. Therefore, the central bank of Canada may 
continue to use these measures as part of its analysis, but their limitations need to be 
acknowledged. 
Massimiliano, M. and Anindya, B., (2005) studied a thorough analysis of leading indicators for 
Euro-area inflation and GDP growth. The authors considered many single (European and US) 
indicators, factors extracted from the set of indicators, groups of indicators or factors with the 
final specification determined by an automated model selection procedure and pooled forecasts. 
The comparison of the forecasting models used was conducted with respect to an autoregressive 
model, both ex post and in a pseudo-real-time context based on their performance for up to one-
year and up to two-year forecasts. The authors argued that such a loss function, the RMSE-h 
criterion, is particularly relevant in a policy-making context. A major observation was that both 
for inflation and GDP growth, ex-post, autoregressions are systematically beaten by univariate 
leading indicator models, but the best indicator changes over time. This reflects the fact that in 
forecasting practice, although some groups of indicators perform robustly, it is advisable to 
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update continuously the choice of indicators or groups of indicators. Moreover, the dynamics of 
the variable forecast will be driven by different shocks at different points of time, so that 
different indicators will assume different relevance over different time periods. Thus, even in the 
best-case scenario under ex-post evaluation autoregressions (sufficiently differenced for 
stationarity), which are simple models, are hard to beat consistently with a single forecasting 
model and overall provide a robust forecasting tool. 
Sanchez-Fung, R. J., (2003), studied the information content of monetary and open economy 
indicators in the conduct of monetary policy in two inflation targeting Latin American 
economies i.e. Chile and Mexico. The main findings of the analyses revealed that for Chile both 
the real money gap and real money growth indicators contain significant information on 
deviations of inflation from the inflation target. In contrast, for Mexico different measures of the 
real exchange rate were found to be consistently relevant in the pre and post- inflation targeting 
(1999) periods. The author concluded that the results are of considerable importance to 
policymakers as they convey that neglecting the role that monetary and open economy indicators 
play in monetary policy making within an inflation targeting framework could be detrimental to 
the successful operation of an inflation targeting strategy. 
3.4 Why use inflation indicators to target inflation? 
  
If inflation indicators are not well considered, they can fail to predict inflation. Some indicators 
of inflation can yield good results in short term horizons and some in the long-term horizons. 
Therefore, there is always a need for considering all inflation indicators to predict inflation in 
either the short run or the long run. Some of the inflation indicators can contain information that 
is more relevant in immediate future where as others may be more relevant on an intermediated 
horizon. Inflation indicators help policymakers to monitor signals from a range of indicators and 
to know whether these indicators of inflation consistently fail to predict inflation. If this is the 
case, then this will result in dropping these inflation indicator variables in predicting the rate of 
inflation. 
 
A justification can also be made if the indicator variables can predict inflation within the selected 
economy. If inflation indicators are well incorporated, they provide precise inflation predictions. 
A full knowledge of the inflation indicators on the rate of inflation will therefore be of great 
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significance to the SARB in forecasting inflation and that focusing core inflation indicators will 
allow monetary authorities to prevent themselves from being misguided by the effects of 
temporary shocks on the evolution of the Consumer Price Index.   
 
According to Figueiredo, M. R. F. and Staub, R. B., (2001), the analysis and evaluation of the 
individual inflation indicator to the prediction of inflation rate helps to eliminate temporary 
fluctuations from consumer price index allowing monetary authorities to identify shocks hitting 
the inflation rate that do not affect the trend inflation. Temporary shocks, despite influencing the 
headline index, are quickly reversed without affecting expectations and, therefore, do not 
demand a policy response from the monetary authority. 
 
In this research paper, an employment of cointegration modelling will be carried out to 
determine if there is long-term relationship between the inflation rate and the inflation indicators. 
The purpose of this contribution is to examine the inflation rate and the inflation indicators in 
South Africa and investigate whether the inflation indicators move in a tandem with the inflation 
rate. 
 
3.5 Background of monetary policy in South Africa 
 
Monetary policy
4
 in South Africa is conducted by the South African Reserve Bank. The Bank 
was established in 1921 in terms of a special Act of Parliament, the Currency and Banking Act of 
10 August 1920 (the Act), and was the direct result of the abnormal monetary and financial 
conditions which had arisen during and in the period immediately following World War I. The 
South African Constitution that which approved by the Constitutional Court in December 1996 
states that the primary object of the SARB is to protect the value of the currency in the interest of 
balanced and sustainable economic growth in the Republic guarantees the legal independence of 
the SARB.  
 
                                                             
4
 Monetary policy can be defined as the measures taken by the monetary authorities to influence 
the quantity of money or the rate of interest with a view to achieving stable prices, full 
employment and economic growth. 
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Monetary policy in South Africa is going through a rapid transition. There have been three broad 
monetary policy regimes since the 1960s. The first regime was a liquid asset ratio-based system 
with quantitative controls on interest rates and credit and it operated until the early 1980s. De 
Kock Commission introduced the dual currency exchange rate system in 1979 and it allowed 
greater flexibility in exchange control. The main policy emphasis was on the central bank’s 
discount rate in influencing the cost of overnight collateralised lending and hence market interest 
rates. Gold price declined in 1983 that resulted in the fall of the rand and this was further 
weakened by the political upheaval in 1985. A broader set of indicators were formally introduced 
in 1990 and among these were the exchange rate, asset prices, the output gap, the balance of 
payments; wage settlements, total credit extension, and the fiscal stance (SARB Quarterly 
Bulletin, October, 1997). These indicators played a significant role in stabilising inflation. From 
early 1998, a new system of monetary accommodation was introduced with daily tenders of 
liquidity through repurchase transactions. The SARB signals policy intentions on short term 
interest rates to the market through the amount offered at the daily tender for repurchase 
transactions.  
 
Governor Stals (1989-1999). Levels of imports were very high towards elections in 1994 and 
these were phased out in 1995. Prior to the 1994 elections, there were again huge capital 
outflows. In 1993, the SARB was unable to prevent the nominal effective depreciation caused by 
borrowing from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In 1995, Stals put a monetary policy in 
place to curb excess money supply. 
 
3.6 Monetary policy now and how it works 
 
Monetary policy can be defined as the measures taken by the monetary authorities to influence 
the quantity of money or the rate of interest with a view to achieving stable prices, full 
employment and economic growth. Monetary policy is an ongoing process whose implications 
can only be understood in conjunction with the broad economic context and with the goals that 
policy itself is trying to achieve. All policy actions are linked together with the underlying 
circumstances and goals. Specific monetary policy actions have different impacts on economic 
agents depending on the overall policy framework according to which they are conducted. This 
clearly explains that a monetary policy strategy is a framework that a central bank uses to 
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translate relevant information into actions and to publicly explain such actions. It is the monetary 
policy strategy that really matters when it comes to affecting market expectations and indirectly 
economic behaviour and outcomes. 
Monetary policy in South Africa has acquired a high degree of public importance since it is a 
source of inflation stability due to its ability to anchor inflationary expectations. Stable inflation 
expectations contribute to more stable exchange rate expectations. In South Africa, the Reserve 
Bank implements South Africa's monetary policy and regulates the supply and availability of 
money by influencing its cost (Mboweni, T. T., 2008). The South African Reserve bank was 
established in 1921 and at that time it was privately owned. The legal independence of the SARB 
is guaranteed by the South African Constitution which was approved by the Constitutional Court 
in December 1996. The South African monetary policy has been changing through the different 
monetary policy regimes governed by De Kock, Chris Stals, Tito Mboweni and currently Gill 
Marcus. The South African economy has been undergoing some inflation variability. The former 
SARB governor Tito Mboweni announced inflation targeting to stabilise inflation, render 
transparency and accountability of the central bank’s decision-making to make reasonable 
forecasts of interest rates, to reduce fall in the currency value, to lower economic uncertainty and 
to support investment and growth (Mboweni, T. T., 2008).  
Since the inception of inflation targeting, South African Reserve Bank has been failing to keep 
the actual inflation rate within the target band at a continuous basis. Many variables provide 
information on the causes of inflation and indicate the magnitude each contributes towards the 
inflation rate. A review of inflation indicators in South Africa will be assessed. Inflation 
indicators are measures that are used by Statistics South Africa (SSA) to indicate whether 
inflation is rising or falling and the sectors of the economy where this is happening. Most often 
the public blames the MPC (Monetary Policy Committee) for failure to achieve the target while 
masking the real shocks that monetary policy is often responding to. The relationship between 
the inflation rate and the various inflation indicators in South Africa and the magnitude in which 
each factor causes inflation to the economy will be analysed. A demonstration of the 
understanding of inflation targeting and its indicators in formulating of a successful inflation 
target in South Africa will be explained. 
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The Reserve Bank of South Africa is using various instruments to influence the quantity of 
money and interest rates in South Africa. It is now focusing on market rather than the direct 
measures that it used to implement in the past. These measures stimulate the private institutions 
to act in a certain way on a voluntary basis. The South African monetary policy uses the repo 
rates
5
 to encourage the private enterprises through buying and selling on the market. A change in 
the repo rates changes the interest rates on overdrafts and other loans. 
 
The SARB also uses the open market policy. This is where the government sale or purchase local 
financial assets like government securities and treasury bills through the reserve bank in order to 
influence interest rates and the quantity of money in the economy. The reserve bank can increase 
money supply by buying government securities on the open market and can encourage 
participants to sell their securities by raising the price of bonds and this lowers the interest rates. 
 
In February 2000, the South African government embarked on inflation targeting as a monetary 
policy. The target was set at 3-6%. Its objectives were as follows: to keep the public informed 
about future inflation trends, providing an anchor for inflation expectation, increasing the 
transparency of monetary policy, improving the accountability of the monetary authorities, 
increasing stability in nominal interest rates, reducing inflation expectations by reorienting them 
towards the future, reducing the degree of money illusion in the economy and providing stability 
in the value of money which enhances growth prospects  (Mboweni, T. T., 2000). 
 
South Africa’s current monetary policy under inflation targeting 
 
Under the inflation-targeting framework, the monetary authority is the South African Reserve 
Bank. The legal mandate is stated in both the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa and in 
the South African Reserve Bank Act, No 90 of 1989 of which the primary objective is to protect 
the value of the currency in order to obtain balanced and sustainable economic growth. The Bank 
regards its primary goal as the achievement and maintenance of price stability while actively 
                                                             
5
 The repo rate is part of the reserve bank’s accommodation policy that gives assistance to the 
banking sector and this represents a cost of credit to the banking sector. 
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promoting financial stability. There is operational independence. The Government sets the target 
after consultation with the Bank. A target range of 3%–6% has been set since year 2000. The 
target horizon is on a continuous basis while the key policy rate is the Repo rate. The decision-
making body is the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). The MPC consists of seven members: 
the Governor, three Deputy Governors and three senior officials of the Bank and zero external 
members. 
 
The President of the Republic of South Africa appoints the Governor and Deputy Governors of 
the Bank after consultations with the Minister of Finance and the Board of Directors of the Bank. 
Other MPC members are appointed by the Governor. The Governor and Deputy Governors are 
appointed for five-year terms and can be re-appointed. The decision-making process is by 
consensus. The frequency of decision making meeting are usually six times a year. 
 
The central bank uses a core macro econometric model specifically suited for inflation targeting 
purposes, complemented by a suite of other models for modelling and forecasting. Published 
forecasts like fan chart forecasts of inflation and GDP growth are published in the Monetary 
Policy Review twice a year and the main elements of the central forecasts are described in the 
MPC statement published after each meeting.  
 
The Governor appears before the Portfolio Committee on Finance at least three times a year for 
parliamentary hearings for accountability purposes. For communication and publications 
purposes, an immediate announcement of policy decision is done with a press release and also a 
statement of the Monetary Policy Committee is published. 
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Chapter 4 
 
4.0 Implementation, preconditions and challenges of inflation targeting 
 
4.1 Introduction: How to implement inflation targeting 
  
As aforementioned, the objective of monetary policy is price stability leading to stable inflation. 
This is easy to mention but is much harder to specify what that means in terms of observable 
quantities. Numeral decisions need to be made in how to implement an inflation target to attain 
price stability and what are the other factors to put into account when introducing an inflation 
targeting framework. This part will clearly elaborate on how to implement an inflation targeting 
framework and important points to note when implementing inflation targeting. 
4.1.1 Single point or target range 
 
A choice has to be made between setting a single point or a target range. A narrower band may 
be interpreted as indicating a stronger commitment to the inflation target, but frequent breaches 
could undermine credibility. A fixed-point target is much more difficult to achieve than a band. 
A single point provides the best focus for inflation expectations and avoids the disadvantage of a 
band which tends to concentrate expectations towards its upper boundary. Although this may be 
the case, it should be brought to attention that all economic behavior and outcomes are not 
completely predictable and it is difficult to hit continuously a single point target for inflation. 
Trying to do so could cause interest rates to be excessively volatile and could destabilize 
financial markets. A band, however, leaves some discretion to the central bank and can provide 
more flexibility in the case of unforeseen price shocks. To support this view, Bernanke, B. S., et 
al., (1997) states that inflation targets are typically specified as a range and these generally 
reflect not only uncertainty about the link between policy levers and inflation outcomes but is 
also intended to allow the central bank some flexibility in the short run.  
4.1.2 Level of target 
 
After deciding whether a single point or range will be used, it is important to decide at what level 
the target should be set. The rationale for a range lies in the imperfect control of monetary policy 
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over the target. Preferably it should rather be on the low rather than on the high side. High targets 
may give the impression that the central bank is not serious about combating inflation. It is 
accordingly better to lengthen the period over which the target will be reached than starting at 
too a high level. As articulated by Tutar, E., (2002), the inflation target provides full 
transparency in the implementation of monetary policy that enables financial institutions in the 
market to foresee the future with less uncertainty and behave accordingly. Therefore, a band 
introduces some degree of flexibility in the conduct of monetary policy. It gives the central bank 
some discretion over which point in the band it aims for in taking its policy decisions and allows 
it to accommodate transitory shocks to inflation and this ability can provide a partial substitute 
for targeting a core inflation rate. 
According Debelle, G., (1999), the choice of bandwidth involves a trade-off between credibility 
and flexibility. A narrow band can be announced with hard edges which is breached 
occasionally, or the target can specify a wide band (or instead, only a point target), guaranteeing 
that the target is not breached but possibly undermining the overall credibility of the framework. 
A narrower band may be regarded as a stronger commitment to the inflation target. 
Billmeier, A., (1999) elicits three alternative to the formulation of an inflation target and these 
includes a numerical value that can be specified in terms of a thick point, as a range around some 
center value, or as an upper bound (but, considering the nature of inflation targeting, not as a 
lower bound). The central bank's decision on the bandwidth is characterized by the same 
flexibility-credibility tradeoff that impinges on many other choices in this field. In the case of a 
range, narrowing the range around the focal point shows the central bank's strong commitment to 
achieving the focal point inflation target. On the other hand, it restricts its ability to act 
discretionary in implementing monetary policy. The author argued that optimal monetary policy 
may not be able to forecast inflation perfectly and is definitely subject to unforeseen external 
shocks, thus driving the inflation rate out of the target band. This event is the more likely to 
occur, the smaller the band. Not hitting the target is likely to be destructive for central bank's 
credibility. A target point will realistically never be hit.  
If the band is narrower, the more abrupt the monetary policy instrument will have to react in 
order to cope with unforeseen shocks to the price level. Billmeier, A., (1999) argued that the 
range should be symmetric around this value or skewed to one side or the other. Given that target 
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band deviations result in a credibility loss, one has to consider the nature of deviations from the 
target value. A deviation from the target, be it a point or a range, calls for a modification of the 
policy stance. 
4.1.3 Satisfactory forecasting framework  
 
The implementation of targeting requires that the authorities must be able to develop a 
satisfactory forecasting framework. Although South Africa has experienced major structural 
changes in recent years, it seems that it is in a position to forecast inflation fairly accurately. The 
Reserve Bank already makes regular inflation forecasts using a large macroeconomic model, 
which is based on a wide range of financial and economic equations. In the application of 
inflation targeting it will be prudent to supplement this large model with a number of smaller and 
single equation models. 
4.1.4 Transparency 
 
According to Svennson, L. E. O., (2007) an inflation-targeting central bank must publish a 
regular monetary-policy report which includes the bank’s forecast of inflation and other 
variables, a summary of its analysis behind the forecasts, and the motivation for its policy 
decisions for transparency. The inflation-targeting central banks must provide some information 
or forecasts of its likely future policy decisions. It is very crucial for the Reserve Bank to 
enhance transparency for the effective operation of an inflation-targeting framework. 
Transparency itself introduces predictability and helps to ensure that expectations are consistent 
with the objective of price stability thereby lowering the cost of achieving the inflation target. In 
South Africa, the MPC must avoid exacerbating fluctuations of output and employment. 
Accountability requires a greater transparency, materialized by the publication of central bank 
forecasts. Increased bank transparency is desirable because it reduces uncertainties and helps to 
ensure that expectations are consistent with the objective of price stability. Nonetheless, only an 
optimal level of transparency is needed; a very high degree of transparency is not desirable and 
may reduce the central bank’s effectiveness (Boughrara, A., Boughzala, M., and Moussa, M; 
2008).  
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In South Africa, inflation targeting has significantly strengthened the Central Bank’s mandate to 
focus on price stability. According to Mboweni, T. T., (2000), the numerical inflation target has 
become the overriding objective of monetary policy and it has created greater certainty about the 
Bank’s policy stance and has made the ultimate objective of monetary policy transparent. The 
Central Bank’s transparency, accountability and communication have since been mutually 
reinforced by inflation targeting.  
According to Mboweni in the previous policy regimes there was no explicit benchmark against 
which the performance of the Bank could be measured objectively. The adoption of inflation 
targeting has been followed not only by major improvements in the Central Bank’s 
communication with the public and markets but there has been a significant upgrade in monetary 
policy transparency as well. Among the initiatives to increase transparency and communications 
are the Monetary Policy Forums where the business, labour and the academic sectors, among 
others, discuss monetary policy with members of the Bank; the publication of the Bank’s bi-
annual inflation report, the Monetary Policy Review; the monetary policy statements issued after 
each Monetary Policy Committee meeting, and presentations to various audiences by the 
Governor and deputy governors of the Central Bank (Mboweni, T. T., 2000). 
Conclusively, inflation targeting is characterized by a high degree of transparency. The Central 
Bank must publish a regular monetary-policy report with the bank’s forecast of inflation and 
other variables, a summary of its analysis behind the forecasts, and the motivation for its policy 
decisions. The forecasts of the Central Bank’s likely future policy decisions must be elicited and 
made known to the public. This helps in anchoring public inflation expectations. For example, 
CPIX was announced in the Budget Speech of February 2000 in South Africa. Therefore, policy 
appears to be evolving towards greater transparency, aiming to improve credibility and to 
achieve a more pronounced effect on inflationary expectations. 
4.1.5 Accountability 
 
According to Boughrara, A., Boughzala, M., and Moussa, M., (2008), a central bank with the 
autonomy and the means to accomplish its specified task has to become accountable for its 
actions to the public and to its elected representatives, concerning the successes or failures of its 
policy. The public must have the capacity to punish incompetent policymakers. This creates 
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better incentives for policymakers to do their jobs well and implies periodic reporting 
requirements to the government and to parliament. According to David et al., (2002) inflation 
targeting regime increases the accountability of the policy makers by increasing the 
transparency. In order to make monetary policy more effective in the inflation-targeting 
framework, it is necessary to announce policy changes and to make explicit the reasons for the 
policy changes. In this way, it becomes more apparent whether any breach of the inflat ion target 
resulted from an error of the central bank or whether the breach was predictable at the time of the 
policy decision  
The increased accountability of the inflation targeting enables the monetary authority to monitor 
and enhance the understanding of expectations. It also decreases the possibility of time 
inconsistency trap, which leads to deviations from monetary authority’s long-term objective. 
Moreover, it provides a good benchmark that can easily be observed by the agents in the 
economy. 
By means of accountability, private sector agents can monitor and question the authorities’ 
advice, analysis, and actions. So, this forces the authorities to get their analysis right. Since 
private sector agents can easily observe any myopic policy strategy under a transparent and 
accountable monetary policy framework, there are severe constraints to surprising the public. 
4.2 Challenges of operating an inflation targeting regime 
 
Designing and implementing the inflation targeting regime requires addressing a number of 
technical issues. South Africa's status as an emerging economy has not, however, been the only 
impediment to the failure to maintain the inflation rate within the band in the targeting of 
inflation. There are challenges that can be faced when implementing the inflation targeting 
framework and these includes among others the excessive autonomy, weak accountability, fear 
of floating, un-indexed capital gains tax etc. 
4.2.1 Excessive autonomy 
 
The way the inflation target is determined depends on the autonomy of the central bank. South 
Africa is one of a few countries in which the independence of the central bank has been 
determined in the Constitution of the country. The governments of most countries have preferred 
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to rather spell out the independence of their central banks through an ordinary Act of Parliament. 
The high level of central bank autonomy associated with inflation targeting may lead to 
excessively rigid policy or possibly an increase of output instability. Such fears do not apply to 
the SARB which has used discretion to practice a conservative and prudent monetary policy. The 
institutional framework in South Africa allows the Reserve Bank a great degree of autonomy in 
its operations. 
 4.2.2 Weak accountability and communication 
  
Inflation is generally thought to be hard to control especially in emerging markets which can be 
dramatically affected by external shocks. Periods of high inflation are likely to lead to a re-
evaluation of targets and forecasts which may have disastrous effects on the credibility of a 
central bank. Bernanke, B. S., et al., (1997) states that communication through the announcement 
of inflation targets clarifies the central bank's intentions for the markets and for the general 
public, reducing uncertainty about the future course of inflation. The authors further argue that 
many of the costs of inflation arise from its uncertainty or variability more than from its level. 
Uncertain inflation complicates long-term saving and investment decisions, exacerbates relative 
price volatility, and increases the riskiness of nominal financial and wage contracts. Uncertainty 
about central bank intentions induces the volatility in financial markets. 
In the case of South Africa, however, the SARB has implemented steps to enforce greater 
transparency and accountability within that institution. With expectations management a key 
component of inflation targeting, the communication of the central bank on inflation matters 
becomes increasingly important. Most formal inflation targeting central banks establish a 
monetary policy committee (MPC) with fixed membership, publicized voting structure and a 
pre-announced meeting timetable. An efficient communications strategy is developed whereby 
the MPC decision is announced at a pre-determined time usually accompanied by a press 
statement, with meeting minutes often released with an appropriate lag. This has been the case 
for South Africa and still exercises this role. 
The heightened importance of communicating means that central banks now have the addit ional 
ability to influence interest rate and currency expectations via verbal intervention. Clearly, as the 
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credibility of the central bank becomes more important, consistency in action and 
communication becomes increasingly necessary.  
 
4.2.3 Fear of floating 
 
Inflation targeting tends to necessitate a floating exchange rate regime. Fear of floating or more 
generally, fear of large currency swings, is pervasive for a variety of reasons, particularly among 
emerging market countries like South Africa. The fear of floating phenomenon arises due to 
output costs which are associated with exchange rate fluctuations. Emerging markets which face 
volatile capital flows, large stocks of foreign currency and high levels of dollar denominated debt 
may be justifiably hesitant to allowing their exchange rate to float. In these instances nations may 
choose to manage their exchange rate causing the exchange rate to be viewed as the nominal 
anchor of policy as opposed to the inflation rate. The volatility of the South African rand along 
with the relatively low level of dollar denominated debt in South Africa suggests that this 
concern is unfounded. 
According to Makhubela, O., (2004), South Africa does not seem to be suffering from a dire and 
chronic fear of float syndrome given its relatively better statistics and performance.  South Africa 
remains a small open economy and cannot freely float. The author concludes that South Africa 
has to manage its floating regime until it has sufficient financial depth, low inflation, lower 
interest rate differentials, better confidence in its economy and robust economic growth to enable 
it to absorb shocks better. One way of doing this is to have a managed float with a monitoring 
band and to use interest rates as a crisis-prevention instrument to defend the Rand and to control 
inflation on time. 
4.2.4 Level of fiscal dominance 
 
Introduction 
Most emerging economies are characterized with fiscal dominance which affects price stability 
in these economies. Fiscal dominance is a fiscal decision to overspend significantly or not to 
adjust spending to expected revenues. The fiscal policy will automatically become dominant 
 60 
 
over monetary policy. Dealing with fiscal dominance is a complex issue as it results in high 
likelihood of conflicting policies.   
Constant large fiscal deficits are not compatible with an inflation targeting regime but a sound 
financial system is a precondition for an effectual inflation targeting regime. According to 
Billmeier, A., (1999), a consensus seems to emerge that a successful central bank should be to a 
large extent instrument independent, but not necessarily goal independent. The possibility to 
freely decide over the instruments of monetary policy rests on the fact that there are no 
constraints of fiscal nature, in other words, no signs of fiscal dominance. The author argues that 
spill-over effects from fiscal to monetary policy might be due to (non-negligible) government 
borrowing from the central bank, to an underdeveloped taxation system relying on seigniorage 
revenues, to insufficient financial markets or to explosive dynamics of the public debt.  
According to Debelle, G., et al., (1998), freedom from fiscal dominance implies that government 
borrowing from the central bank is low or nil and that domestic financial markets have enough 
depth to absorb placements of public debt such as treasury bills. The authors further explained 
that this implies that the government has a broad revenue base and does not have to rely 
systematically and significantly on revenues from seigniorage revenues that accrue to the 
government from having the monopoly on issuing domestic money. If fiscal dominance exists, 
inflationary pressures of a fiscal origin will undermine the effectiveness of monetary policy by 
obliging the central bank to accommodate the demands of the government, say, by easing interest 
rates to achieve fiscal goals (Debelle, G., Masson, P., Savastano, M., and  Sharma, S. ; 1998).  
4.2.5 Un-indexed capital gains tax 
 
Unindexed capital gains/loss is the capital gains or losses on the sale of an asset before deducting 
the indexation allowance. Excluding capital gains from the income tax base is an important 
structural weakness in the income tax system, which leads to tax avoidance and the misallocation 
of productive investment resources. The absence of a capital gains tax encourages taxpayers to 
convert ordinary taxable income into tax-free capital gains, thereby reducing their total tax 
burden. The application of scarce resources to tax planning and tax avoidance is clearly a dead-
weight loss to society. In the 2000 Budget, the Minister of Finance announced the introduction of 
a capital gains tax with effect from 1 April 2001 as part of a wider tax reform effort aimed at 
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enhancing the integrity, efficiency and equity of the South African income tax regime. This seeks 
to address some of the existing avoidance opportunities such as recharacterising ordinary 
(taxable) revenue into capital revenue, thereby escaping the tax net. Hence, the introduction of a 
capital gains tax serves as a backstop to the income tax system, which enables the fiscus to 
broaden the tax base and ultimately reduce the rate structure, for a given revenue requirement. 
Given that treasury sets South Africa's inflation target, they may have a bias to run inflationary 
policy to accrue the additional revenue in taxation on the increased nominal value of assets. 
According to the comprehensive income definition, capital gains should be treated no differently 
from other forms of income. Feldstein (1996) in Billmeier, A., (1999) pointed out that due to 
distortions in tax schemes, even low positive inflation will cause substantial welfare losses. The 
author argues that in the presence of distortionary taxes, inflation as a tax on nominal assets may 
be part of the optimal tax mix. This holds especially for developing countries which encounter 
problems in raising tax revenue since the inflation tax can hardly be avoided. The argument is 
weakened by the fact that inflation is considered a rather inefficient and costly way of collecting 
taxes. 
Conclusively, indexation of capital gains tax has a lot of advantages. If capital gains taxes are 
fully indexed for inflation, there will be consistency between the effective capital gains tax rate 
and the statutory tax rate. Indexing reduces the uncertainty arising from inflation. If capital gains 
are not indexed for inflation and inflation turns out to be surprisingly high, taxpayers pay higher 
real effective tax rates. In systems where nominal capital gains are taxed, the effective tax rate 
will diverge from the statutory rate and the degree of such divergence will depend on the 
inflation experience (as well as the interaction between the inflation rate and the real rate of 
return). It is argued that the absence of indexation can distort investment decisions when 
inflationary gains can potentially be subject to taxation. It is suggested that not indexing capital 
gains tax would discourage investment in long-term assets as the uncertainty regarding the 
effective capital gains tax rate on disposal of the asset is increased with the holding period. The 
drawbacks of indexing capital gains tax are that investment decisions can be distorted if the 
capital gains tax system is not indexed for inflation. However, this must be seen in the wider 
context of the entire tax system. Only indexing one part of the tax system will result in further 
distortions in the level and pattern of investment, as well is in the financing of that investment. 
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4.2.6 Target inconsistent government administered prices 
 
While government sets the inflation targets it also fragrantly breaks them by increasing the prices 
of goods distributed through government owned enterprises by more than the target. There are 
also problems with the credibility of the inflation data and particularly its collection. In addition 
to concerns about statistical integrity (including sample content and size), most inflation 
measures are disputed by domestic households. As is the case globally, African households 
generally believe that inflation is underestimated compared to their perceived average price 
pressures. 
 
The publicly owned utilities and economic services industries may be a big problem during an 
inflation targeting era. The administered prices of the parastatals may be poorly regulated and 
not efficiently and not effectively coordinated with the national policy objectives. In South 
Africa, we have enterprises such as Telkom (telecommunications, Transnet (transportation and 
Eskom (electricity) that provides essential inputs and services to sectors throughout the South 
African economy (Robert, P., et al., 2007). Their pricing conduct and behaviour therefore has a 
major influence on the competitiveness of the economy as a whole and of the alignment between 
the productive side of the economy under public ownership and government economic policy.  
 
Prices should be an outcome of a process of negotiation rather than an integrated regulatory 
framework. Large industrial users of electricity are able to negotiate more favourable rates than 
small commercial enterprises. This effectively subsidises the costs of production for larger firms 
at the expense of smaller-scale users giving the former a competitive advantage that may be 
inconsistent with the objectives of the industrial policies. 
 
Conclusively, the price controlling agencies never come close to gaining a full appreciation of all 
of the ramifications of their actions, and their procedures never come close to keeping pace with 
the rate of pertinent economic and technological changes. These disadvantages are serious during 
periods of relative economic stability. 
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4.2.7 Centralised wage bargaining 
 
According to Daniels, P. J., Nourzad, F. and VanHoose, D. D., (2004), using a model of an open 
economy containing both sectors in which wages are market-determined and sectors with wage-
setting arrangements, the authors found that increased centralization of wage setting initially 
causes inflation to increase but then results in an inflation drop-off; secondly, a greater degree of 
centralized wage setting reduces the inflation-restraining effect of greater central bank 
independence, and finally, they found that increased openness is more likely to reduce inflation 
in nations with less centralized wage bargaining. 
By raising wages above gains in productivity and limiting the effective transmission of wage and 
price mechanisms through the economy, centralised wage bargaining limits the success of 
inflation targeting. Centralized wage bargaining is beneficial to aggregate real-wage restraint and 
low unemployment. Under decentralised wage setting,  an investment externality may arise 
because of the turn-over of labour, employees in a given firm will give up before they can reap 
the benefits of higher future wages from present investment in new capital stock. This will lessen 
union incentives for current wage restraint in order to promote such an investment. Real-wage 
increases may impose an unemployment externality on the rest of the economy. The reason is 
that an unemployment rise in one sector makes it more difficult for out of work workers 
everywhere in the economy to find new jobs. An input price externality will also arise when 
wage increases in one part of the economy causes prices to rise for the products used as material 
inputs by other firms. The outcome will be lower output somewhere else and also lower 
employment if material inputs and labour are complements in production.   
Conclusively, a consumer price externality will emanate when one person wage increase and this 
leads to a price increase in another person’s price. Every wage increase in the economy 
contributes to a rise of the general price level and therefore to a fall in the real disposable income 
of all workers and capital owners that are not directly affected by the wage bargain.  
4.3 Why not pursue zero inflation target 
 
Many questions can be asked on setting the targets. If inflation is socially undesirable, so why do 
central banks not pursue a zero inflation target? Having stated the theoretical possibilities, if 
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inflation is indeed detrimental to economic activity and growth, then how low should inflation 
be? According to IMF paper (2000)
6
, the main reason is the technical difficulty of measuring 
inflation with complete accuracy. The main goal of having the target is to promote a well-
functioning economy. Protecting the value of money by maintaining inflation at low and stable 
rates should stabilize inflation expectations and enable effective investment decision-making, 
thereby increasing productivity and also helps to dampen economic cycles. Inflation rates 
calculated from consumer price indices are subject to an upward measurement bias, so that when 
measured inflation equals zero, actual inflation is negative. And because economists have well-
justified fears of deflation, they typically consider it prudent to target a modestly positive rate of 
measured inflation. Theoretical reasons can also be found for erring on the positive side. When 
inflation is zero, real interest rates cannot be negative. But negative real interest rates can be a 
powerful instrument for economic recovery during a recession. Moreover, when nominal prices 
have downward rigidities, as is common with wages, a positive inflation rate allows real wages 
to decline after an unfavorable shock hits the economy, thus reducing the necessary adjustment 
costs. 
4.4 Preconditions for inflation targeting in South Africa 
 
According to  Mboweni, T. T., (1999), before inflation targeting is implemented, it is important 
that a decision is taken on the inflation target that will be set; a satisfactory forecasting 
framework is developed; and a high degree of transparency is ensured.  A target is specified in 
terms of the consumer price index, or some variant thereof. There is, however, no consensus on 
how inflation should be measured. The index chosen must include a range of products whose 
prices fully describe changes in the cost of living and are generally accepted by the public. The 
reason being that the inclusion of prices over which policy has no control may lead to misleading 
signals when these prices move out of line. Policy makers must opt for a target that excludes 
certain measurable components that are unpredictable, volatile or unresponsive to policy. David 
et al (2002) points three prerequisites for the implementation of an inflation targeting framework 
for monetary policy. These include independence of the central bank, the absence of 
commitments to objectives that might be in conflict with low inflation and lastly the presence of 
                                                             
6
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a stable and predictable relationship between monetary policy instruments and inflation. It is 
essential that a central bank is free to pursue financial stability. The inflation target may be 
jointly set by the government and the central bank. However, once the target has been 
determined the central bank should be free to use any instrument to achieve the ultimate 
objective. Tutar, E., (2002) in his study of inflation targeting in the Turkish economy points 
these three prerequisites for inflation targeting as follows: 
 Central bank independence, 
 Having a sole target, 
 Existence of stable and predictable relationship between monetary policy instruments and 
inflation. 
Tutar further propounded that in many developing countries, the use of seigniorage revenues as 
an important source of financing public debts, the lack of commitment to low inflation as a 
primary goal by monetary authorities, considerable exchange rate flexibility, lack of substantial 
operational independence of the central bank or of powerful models to make domestic inflation 
forecasts hinder the satisfaction of these requirements. 
4.5 Prerequisites of inflation targeting 
 
4.5.1 Effectiveness of the monetary policy 
 
The existence of a stable relationship between the inflation outcomes and monetary policy 
instruments is an essential precondition of inflation targeting. Monetary authorities have to be 
able to model inflation dynamics in the country and to forecast the inflation to a reasonable 
degree. The monetary authorities should have access to policy instruments that are effective in 
influencing the macroeconomic variables (David et al., (2002). The South African central bank 
must continue to publish regularly the detailed assessments of the inflation situation including 
current forecasts of inflation and discussions of the policy response that is needed to keep 
inflation on track. 
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4.5.2 Resources 
 
Mboweni, T. T., (1999) adds resources as a prerequisite for inflation targeting regime. For the 
implementation of inflation targeting the central bank must have the necessary resources, i.e. 
human, technological, etc. Inflation targeting requires sophisticated forecasting models, which 
need advanced computer hardware and software. They must set up a model or methodology for 
inflation forecasting that uses a number of indicators containing information on future inflation. 
In developing economies in particular, this could be an important constraint on the 
implementation of inflation targeting. The Reserve Bank of South Africa should be able to refine 
and strengthen its forecasting framework, especially with the help of international experts. To 
implement inflation targeting it is also important that well-developed financial markets exist in a 
country. The policy instruments generally used by monetary authorities require effective money, 
capital and foreign exchange markets. If financial markets do not react quickly to the instruments 
applied, it obviously reduces the effectiveness of monetary policy and leads to a delay in 
impacting on inflation. 
According to Kulhanek L
7
; and Debelle, G., Masson, P.,  Savastano, M., and  Sharma, S., (1998), 
a country adopting inflation targeting must devise a forward-looking operating procedure in 
which monetary policy instruments are adjusted in line with the assessment of future inflation to 
hit the chosen target. The monetary authorities must have the technical and institutional capacity 
to model and forecast domestic inflation, know something of the time lag between the 
adjustment of the monetary instruments and their effect on the inflation rate, and have a well-
informed view of the relative effectiveness of the various instruments of monetary policy at their 
disposal. 
                                                             
7
 Kulhanek L. Indicators for inflation targeting in the Czech republic. Page 450-456. 
(http://www.opf.slu.cz/vvr/akce/turecko/pdf/Kulhanek.pdf)  
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4.5.3 Sole target 
 
Another requirement for adopting the inflation targeting is the absence of another targeted 
nominal variable such as wages, level of employment or nominal exchange rate (David et al., 
2002). For example, when a country chooses fixed exchange rate system, it will be unable to 
reach its inflation target and exchange rate target at the same time. The reason being that in the 
presence of capital mobility, the exchange rate target subordinates the monetary policy to be 
implemented and leads to the deviation from the targeted inflation rate. On the other hand, 
having more than one target may destroy the credibility of both anchors and there might be 
conflicts among the objectives. Other economic objectives can be achievable in having more 
than one target as long as they are consistent with the inflation target. 
4.5.4 Knowledge of economy operation 
 
According to Mboweni, T. T., (1999), one of the crucial elements of a successful inflation 
targeting regime is the use of inflation forecasts as the main intermediate variable that guides 
decisions on instrument settings. In order to apply such a forward-looking procedure, the central 
bank must have adequate knowledge about the way the economy works. That is, it ought to be 
able to model the monetary policy transmission mechanism with, at least, a sufficient degree of 
accuracy to correctly assess inflationary pressures and the implications of consequent decisions 
for instrument setting. Therefore the central bank staff must have adequate technical skills to 
extract the correct signals from the available information. Tutar, E., 2002:1 stipulates that there 
must be knowledge of the existence of a stable and predictable relationship between the 
monetary policy instruments and inflation rate. 
4.5.5 Central bank independence 
 
The basic precondition to implementing an inflation targeting regime is operational 
independence for the central bank in the conduct of monetary policy (Tutar, E., 2002:1). The 
central bank must be given complete independence to adjust freely its instruments of monetary 
policy toward the attainment of the objective of low inflation. This is one of the fundamental 
institutional requirements which enable the central bank to freely adjust its instruments of 
monetary policy to attain its objective of low inflation. Independence means that no factor other 
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than inflation should condition monetary policy decisions. In other words it implies that the 
central bank has enough discretion in the conduct of monetary policy and in particular that it can 
decide to finance or not to finance the government budget. Moreover, there should not be any 
political pressure on the central bank to target any objective inconsistent with the achievement of 
the inflation target.  The presence of fiscal dominance, for example, is incompatible with 
instrument independence.  
According to David et al., (2002), the term independence does not mean the full independence 
but implies at least instrumental independence which permits greater discretion in the conduct of 
monetary policy and which mainly implies that the central bank can not finance the government 
budget. In the same manner, the central bank should not be required to attain low interest rates 
on public debt or to maintain a particular nominal exchange rate. To successfully pursue an 
inflation target, the central bank must have the freedom to adjust its instrument of monetary 
policy in the manner it feels necessary to achieve the inflation target. 
According to Debelle, G., et al., (1998), no central bank can be entirely independent of 
government influence, but it must be free in choosing the instruments to achieve the rate of 
inflation that the government deems appropriate. The authors argue that to comply with central 
bank independence requirement, a country cannot exhibit symptoms of fiscal dominance 
meaning fiscal policy considerations cannot dictate monetary policy.  
In South Africa, the Central Bank is operationally independent in terms of the Constitution and 
the South African Reserve Bank Act. This means that while the Ministry of Finance and the 
Bank jointly recommended the inflation-target range to be adopted by Government and 
sanctioned by Parliament, the Bank retains complete autonomy to decide on the instruments used 
to achieve the goals of monetary policy and instrument settings (Mnyande, M., 2009). 
Conclusively, although central bank independence is important, Hayo, B. and Hefeker, C., 
(2001) in their study argued that the conventional view that central bank independence is 
necessary and/or sufficient instrument for achieving low inflation rates has been found not 
convincing in their study. The authors argue that societies have to make two decisions about 
monetary policy. First, they decide on the importance being attached to fighting inflation as an 
important objective. Then the second decision has to be made on what is the best institutional 
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arrangement to achieve the objective of price stability, given the existing political, legal, and 
economic framework. The first decision indicates central bank independence is not a sufficient 
condition for price stability as it is not the ultimate cause but just an instrument among many to 
achieve this objective. The second decision makes clear central bank independence is not a 
necessary condition for price stability in general, although it may be the right solution for some 
countries. In conclusion, the authors elicit that central bank independence is not a sufficient 
condition for price stability, and it should not be treated as an exogenous variable and that it 
would be wrong to regard central bank independence as a cause for low inflation rates. 
4.5.6 Nominal exchange rate flexibility 
 
A flexible exchange rate is a prerequisite for successful inflation targeting as the central bank 
cannot credibly commit to a second objective under an inflation-targeting framework. According 
to Tatiana, L. and Geoff, B., (2011), a flexible exchange rate works as a shock absorber in 
particular for a country like South Africa which is frequently exposed to large terms of trade 
shocks. The author argues that the negative impact of currency fluctuations on balance sheet (one 
of the key reasons for currency management) being less pronounced in South Africa is due to the 
relatively low levels of foreign-currency denominated debt and dollarisation of domestic 
contracts compared to other emerging markets. 
Inflation targeting requires nominal exchange rate flexibility. In South Africa’s case a fully 
flexible exchange rate regime has been adopted. This means that there is no specific target for 
the exchange rate. It does not, however, mean that the Bank is not concerned about the exchange 
rate, as exchange rate changes do affect the inflation process (Mboweni, T. T., 2000). According 
to Mishkin, F. S., (2000), emerging-market countries, including those engaging in inflation 
targeting have been reluctant to adopt an attitude of favourable exchange-rate movements 
because of the existence of a sizable stock of foreign currency or a high degree of partial 
dollarization. The author propounded that these countries have been limiting the exchange-rate 
flexibility, not only through the explicit use of exchange-rate bands, but also through frequent 
intervention in the foreign-exchange market. Basing to movements in a flexible exchange rate 
runs the risk of transforming the exchange rate into a nominal anchor for monetary policy that 
takes precedence over the inflation target in the eyes of the public. In conclusion, Mishkin 
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proposes that the inflation-targeting central banks in emerging market countries must adopt a 
transparent policy of smoothing short-run exchange-rate fluctuations that helps mitigate 
potentially destabilizing effects of abrupt exchange-rate changes while making it clear to the 
public that they will allow exchange rates to reach their market-determined level over longer 
horizons.  
4.6 Conclusion 
 
Conclusively, if the above basic requirements are met, a country can adopt a monetary policy 
centered on inflation targeting. The Central Reserve Bank and the MPC must establish a forecast 
of the quantitative targets and must unambiguously indicate to the public that striking the 
inflation target takes superiority over all other objectives of monetary policy as explained above. 
South Africa has met these conditions for implementation of an inflation targeting regime as 
explained. For example, South Africa has a proven track record for both the prudency of its fiscal 
policy and the stability of its financial institutions. According to Woglom (2000) in Englama, A., 
et al., (2009)
8
, South Africa is ready for inflation targeting. This means most/if not all of the 
discussed conditions have been met in the implementation of inflation targeting. 
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Chapter 5 
 
5.0 Critiques and country specific alternatives of inflation targeting 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
A number of frameworks are used internationally which range from exchange rate targeting, real 
targeting, monetary aggregates, price level targeting and inflation targeting framework. These 
frameworks have been used in different countries and have been useful as tools to price stability 
and low inflation. These monetary policy tools can be used in isolation or a combination. In 
South Africa, the monetary policy committee (MPC) reviews every monetary tool and assesses 
its significance. A change of monetary policy tool can be done if the monetary policy tool is not 
producing better and fruitful results. Looking on the history of monetary policy, there has been 
no best monetary stance that stayed in use for a country for an unforeseeable future. Monetary 
policy stance has been changing due to different factors affecting the economy resulting in the 
change in monetary policy formulation. This chapter evaluates the country specific alternative 
monetary policy instruments/frameworks to a lower or stable inflation. Most of these 
frameworks have been in use and are still used by other countries. 
5.1.1 Real targeting 
 
Epstein, G., (2003) argues that real targeting approach to monetary policy is superior alternative 
than the costly and ineffective inflation targeting approach. Real targeting is whereby the central 
banks are given a country appropriate target such as employment growth, unemployment, real 
GDP or investment given an inflation constraint. The central bank uses the real target and the 
constraint to find tools and attain the targets through the introduction of new ways, renovating 
the old methods such as asset based reserve requirements and other credit allocation techniques. 
Real targeting enhances the central bank policy transparency, accountability and to be more 
socially useful than most currently existing central bank structures. The central banks choose a 
real target for the country by looking at poverty levels, employment growth, investment or real 
economic growth (Epstein, G., 2003). An example of real targeting framework is employment 
targeting. The central bank, in conjunction with the government estimates a feasible target range 
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for employment growth, taking into account the rates that are consistent with moderate inflation. 
Based on the estimate of the relationship between the central banks’ policy instrument and 
employment growth, the central bank will try to achieve its target. Employment targeting has an 
advantage in that it leads to accumulation of new knowledge, employment and economic growth. 
Real targeting framework is essential as it gives the central bank a mandate to identify a target 
and be able to fight and achieve it. If the target is not reached, a standard is set achieve it. It 
forces the Central bank to invest in research to reach the real target by developing new tools of 
monetary policy. Real targeting is therefore a more a more democratic, transparent and 
accountable central bank policy that serves the whole economy.  
Epstein, G., (2007:13) lists the following five advantages of real targeting:  
 It places front and centre the economic variables that have the most immediate 
and clearest association with social welfare. In the case of implementing a strict 
targeting framework, the central bank will be forced to identify this target and 
then reach it, and if it does not do so, both explain why it failed and how it will 
improve in the next period. 
 Given the public pressure to reach this target, the central bank will have 
significant incentives to invest in research and other activities, to improve its 
understanding and tools to reach this real target. 
 Given that it will need to reach this target amid other constraints, the central bank 
will need to develop new tools of monetary policy. For example, if a central bank 
must hit an employment target subject to an inflation and balance of payments 
constraint, then – in addition to interest rate policy - it might explore asset 
allocation strategies to encourage banks to increase their lending to high 
employment generating activities. 
 A real targeting approach lends itself naturally to a more democratic, transparent 
and accountable central bank policy that serves the genuine needs of the majority 
of countries’ citizens, rather than the minority that typically benefits from the 
combination of slower growth, low inflation, and high real interest rates. 
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 The framework is much more conducive to tailoring monetary policy to the 
specific needs of different countries. For example, if a country has a particular 
problem with generating good jobs for women, or more jobs in a particular region 
of the country, then the real targeting approach can target women’s employment 
or more employment in a specific region (along with more employment generally) 
and devise instruments to achieve those objectives. 
In light of the above merits, Epstein, G., (2007) states that real targeting approach to monetary 
policy is likely to be more developmentally relevant, flexible, effective and democratically 
accountable than inflation targeting. 
5.1.2 Money growth targeting 
 
Svensson, L. E. O., (2007) studied money growth targeting as an alternative to inflation 
targeting. Money growth targeting is whereby the central bank has an explicit target for the 
growth of the money supply. According to the research money growth targeting has been tried in 
several countries but been abandoned because practical experience has consistently shown that 
the relationship between money growth and inflation is too unstable and unreliable for money 
growth targeting to provide successful inflation stabilization. Money growth targeting is a more 
reliable indicator of monetary conditions than variables such as interest rates and free reserves. 
They signal the central bank’s goal and intentions concerning inflation to the public. M3 is the 
broad definition of money and reflects changes in the budget deficit, private credit extension and 
the balance of payments. This alternative is simple and widely understood due to the quantity 
theory of money growth and that it can be used in both the short run and the long run inflation 
target. This keeps the central bank’s inflation objectives and makes the central bank more 
accountable to the public for keeping inflation low. In South Africa, monetary growth target 
(M3) was announced annually during 1986 to 1998 following the recommendations of De Kock 
Commission. The setting of the target aimed both to accommodate projected real GDP growth 
and to contain inflation, though the procedure used to choose the target was not transparent. The 
targets were intended as guidelines rather than strict rules. The SARB had discretion to breach 
targets, for instance in the face of external trade and financial shocks. The drawback was that 
there was no penalty for breaching targets; nor was there a legally-required public rationalization 
when breaching targets (Aron, J. and Muellbauer, J., 2000). 
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An advantage over exchange rate targeting is that monetary targeting enables a central bank to 
adjust its monetary policy to cope with domestic considerations. A monetary target is easily 
understood by the public but not as well as an exchange rate target. Monetary targets have the 
advantage of being able to promote almost immediate accountability for monetary policy. The 
disadvantage of monetary targeting is that the link between money growth and inflation is 
subject to long and uncertain lags. The second disadvantage is that the demand for money may 
not be stable, there may be instability of velocity and the money supply may not be controllable. 
This is especially true of broad monetary targets such as M2 or M3 and less so of narrow money. 
 
Cabos, K., et al., (2001) studies monetary targeting versus inflation targeting and they found that 
the main advantages of monetary targets are twofold. Firstly that monetary growth target rates 
are closely related to the instruments of monetary policy, whereas a direct inflation target is 
much less controllable due to the long time lags involved in the transmission of policy actions. 
Secondly that direct inflation targeting is less transparent to the public because it takes into 
consideration various indicators that obscures the decision making process  and that the 
advantage inflation targeting has in its visibility because a larger fraction of the general public 
understands the meaning of inflation as opposed to monetary growth. 
 
5.1.3 Exchange rate targeting 
 
In the process of securing economic stabilization, South Africa has since been devoted to 
stabilizing measures in the domestic foreign exchange market through a myriad of changes to its 
exchange rate regime and the macroeconomic landscape.  
Exchange rate targeting can be in different forms. The fixed exchange rate targeting is where the 
exchange rate is fixed relative to the centre country with an independent monetary policy. 
Sometimes called a pegged exchange rate, is a type of exchange rate regime wherein a currency's 
value is matched to the value of another single currency or to a basket of other currencies, or to 
another measure of value. There is an argument that exchange rate pegging can produce 
desirable monetary policy actions only when the real economy is stable. Bernanke and Mishkin 
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(1997) in Jha, R., (2009)
9
 argue that inflation targeting, in contrast to exchange rate targeting but 
like monetary targeting, enables monetary policy to focus on domestic considerations and to 
respond to shocks to the domestic economy. inflation targeting, like exchange targeting and 
unlike monetary targeting, has the advantage that people easily understand it. Since the central 
bank has a numerical inflation target, the chances of slipping into a time inconsistency trap are 
reduced. 
Svensson, L. E. O., (1999), Bernanke, B. S. and Mishkin. F. S., (1997) and White (2004) in Jha 
Raghbendra (2009) argue that inflation targeting is decision making under discretion, combining 
rules and discretion, with central banks following a targeting rule which sets interest rates to 
reduce the deviation between conditional inflation forecast (the intermediate target of monetary 
policy) and the inflation target to zero over the target horizon. Jha, R., (2009) lists the following 
advantages and disadvantages of the exchange rate targeting over the money targeting policy: 
Advantages 
1. This fixes the inflation rate for internationally traded goods and thus directly contributes to 
keeping inflation under control. It is especially useful for sharply reducing inflation in emerging 
market economies. 
2. If the exchange rate peg is credible, it anchors inflation expectations to the inflation rate in the 
anchor country to whose currency it is pegged. 
3. An exchange rate provides an automatic rule for the conduct of monetary policy that avoids 
the time-inconsistency problem. 
4. An exchange rate is simple and direct and, therefore, is well understood by the public. 
 
 
 
                                                             
9
 The paper evaluates the case for IT in India. It begins by stating the objectives of monetary 
policy in India and argues that inflation control cannot be an exclusive concern of monetary 
policy with widespread poverty still present. 
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Disadvantages 
1. An exchange rate target leads to loss of independent monetary policy. Hence the ability of the 
monetary authorities to respond to shocks is compromised. 
2. The exchange rate peg may persuade large scale foreign borrowing. In the case of emerging 
market economies such loans are invariably denominated in foreign currency. Large 
accumulation of such loans may lead to a crisis. In most developed countries a devaluation may 
have little direct effect on the balance sheets (since debts are denominated in home currency) but 
not so in emerging market economies since debts are denominated in foreign currency. 
3. Bernanke, B. S. and Mishkin, F. S., (1997) argue that exchange rate pegs can lead to financial 
fragility. 
4. Although exchange rate targeting may be initially successful in bringing inflation down a 
successful speculative attack can lead to a resurgence of inflation. 
5.1.4 Price level targeting 
 
Price level targeting is another alternative to inflation targeting. Fischer (1995) in Guender, V. A. 
and Oh, Y. D., (2009) states that under price-level targeting, the central bank announces a 
constant or slowly evolving target for the price level. The distinguishing feature of price level 
targeting is that the policymaker is obliged to offset past shocks to the price level to achieve the 
target level in every period. Implementing price level targeting causes high volatility in inflation 
in the short run but ensures a great deal of certainty about the behavior of the price level in the 
long run. Price-level targeting fixes a target path for the price level for some period in the future. 
If in the early part of the period the price level moves above the target path (if inflation is higher 
than is implied by the target path for the price level) then later in the period the miss has to be 
corrected. That means that at some later stage inflation has to be lower than is implied by the 
target path for the price level.  
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Robert, A., et al., (2007) on his study of price level inflation
10
 found that price level targeting 
dominates inflation targeting. A robust result was drawn that that wage indexation is lower under 
price level targeting than under inflation targeting. This holds when we hold the parameters of 
the interest rate reaction function fixed and when parameters are chosen to maximize 
unconditional welfare. He further propounded that the welfare improves upon switching from 
inflation targeting to price level inflation holding constant the degree of indexation. A central 
bank pursuing a price level target brings the price level back to its target path engaging in 
stronger and long lasting monetary contraction. In view of this, price level targets have 
traditionally been regarded as inappropriate as they would cause greater variability in output, 
inflation and interest rates. Von Hagen, J., et al., (2001) found that price level targeting has 
superior stabilization properties that give low inflation and nominal interest rates.   
According to Guender, V. A., et al., (2009), in practice inflation targeting is clearly preferred to 
price-level targeting. According to the authors, inflation targeting is considered to be a best-
practice strategy for monetary policy. Price-level targeting is not really thought of as a viable 
option in central-banking circles because of practical considerations such as the fear of the 
consequences of deflation for the economy at large. 
5.1.4.1 Differences between inflation targeting and price level targeting 
 
Price-level targeting is whereby the central bank promises to keep the price level within a 
prespecified band. Although similar with inflation targeting, the two rules have a fundamental 
difference. Inflation targeting is forward-looking, as its goal is to stabilize the growth rate in 
prices. In contrast, price-level targeting builds in a backward-looking element because the target 
is the level of prices. In other words, under inflation targeting, the price level follows a random 
walk whilst under price-level targeting, the price level fluctuates around a predetermined path. 
Inflation targeting does not require that a period of above-target inflation that has to be 
                                                             
10
 The rationale for considering price level targeting policy is to reduce price-level uncertainty. If 
agents are better able to predict future prices, this simplifies intertemporal comparisons, 
encourages longer contracts, and avoids redistribution of income arising from incorrect price-
level expectations. The main cost of following such a policy is assumed to be the greater 
variability of output needed to restore prices to their target path (Maclean, D., and Pioro, H., 
2004). 
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compensated by a period of below-target inflation. In other words, inflation targeting permits 
base drift in the price level, whereas price-level targeting does not. The common criticism of 
price-level targeting is its focus on the past. Carlstrom, T. C., and Fuerst. S. T., (2002), suggest 
that a price-level target may be better than an inflation target because of its inherent backward-
looking feature. This may allow the monetary authority to enjoy many of the benefits of inflation 
targeting without exposing inflation to potentially destabilizing shocks. 
Conclusively, the desirability of price-level targeting is that it reduces long term uncertainty 
about the price level which is essential to the entering of long-term contracts denominated in 
nominal money amounts. 
 
5.2 Conclusion 
 
The above are propositions to low rates of inflation with any given economy. Most of which 
have been adopted by different countries and helped in keeping inflation to low levels which is 
conducive to reduced unemployment and stable output. The different tools to low inflation 
indicated in this chapter shows that there is no single factor on its own that is sufficient to 
explain or improve the economy to a very stable low inflation. There is no viable alternative 
monetary policy that can improve growth and employment prospects. Increased competition in 
domestic and international markets has led to deregulation and the globalization of the world 
economy has brought competitive pressures leading to failure in some of the above propositions.  
In an internationally financially integrated economy with high levels of international capital 
flows, monetary policy can be extremely challenging. In general, it might be very difficult to 
device a monetary policy by targeting monetary aggregates or by pegging an exchange rate along 
with the vision to promoting employment growth.   
Therefore, the best monetary framework can be chosen in line with the prevailing market 
conditions and the current rate of inflation. The instrument must encapsulate the real variables 
that cause inflation, variables that contribute directly to economic welfare of the majority of the 
country’s residents, must allow the central bank to identify its goals, makes transparent in 
reaching that goal and must increase the accountability of the central bank to the general public. 
In any given economy, any macroeconomic policy framework which attempts to solve the ills of 
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poverty, high unemployment and slow economic growth at the same time keeping inflation and 
other problems in check may be the best. In other words, in the case where one of the above 
elaborated monetary policy instruments fails, maybe the adoption of a more multi-faceted 
monetary policy where all of the macro-economic policy objectives such as employment, 
sustainable economic growth, price stability, financial stability are equally prioritized and dealt  
with may be crucial. 
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Chapter 6 
 
6.0 Data and diagnostics 
 
6.1 Data sources and definitions of indicator variables 
 
Quarterly secondary data covering the period 1997:Q2 to 2008:Q3 has been used. Data after 
2008 has not been included because of the change of the SARB monetary stance due to the 
global financial crisis of 2008. As aforementioned, inflation targeting depends on a forecast of 
how inflation will develop assuming that monetary policy is unchanged also on an estimate of 
how future inflation is likely to be affected by a change in the current setting of monetary policy 
instruments. Therefore, the data after 2008 has not been included in this study. With the financial 
crisis, the SARB has been following a more flexible monetary policy regime placing more 
emphasis on economic growth and financial stability. In an even greater departure from standard 
inflation targeting practice, this new approach even included an attempt to manage asset prices, a 
procedure that previously was seen as a violation of inflation targeting doctrine. Nonetheless, the 
SARB has continued to call this regime an inflation targeting regime. 
The global financial crisis has exerted a significant impact on central banks in the both the 
developed and developing world. South Africa has not avoided the ripple effects of the crisis 
although it has avoided the full-fledged banking crisis taking place in a number of countries. The 
study looks at the initial phase of the explicit inflation targeting regime in South Africa which 
lasted until the end of 2008 when the global financial crisis began. According to Van Der Merwe 
(2004), before the announcement of inflation targeting as a monetary policy in South Africa in 
2000, an informal inflation targeting was already applied by the South African Reserve Bank. 
Burger, P. et al., (2009) also examines time when the SARB used the unofficial (implicit) 
inflation target regime in South Africa within the period 1990-2000 with the time when the 
SARB used the official inflation targeting. This made this study to lag back to three years back 
prior to the public announcement of inflation targeting. This period of informal inflation 
targeting brought light and confidence that formal inflation targeting will work and bring price 
stability to the South African economy.  
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Van Der Merwe (2004) states that success was achieved with informal inflation targeting in 
bringing the inflation rate down to lower levels in the 1990s as it moved below double digits in 
December 1992 and declined to an average annual rate of 5,2 per cent in 1999. It is believed that 
an emphasis was placed on the attainment of price stability but the time period over which it was 
to be achieved was not specified. This means that the monetary policy stance one way or another 
was altered by this decision. The framework differed from formal inflation targeting because 
growth in money supply was the intermediate target used which anchored monetary policy 
decisions by this period of informal inflation targeting. The SARB closely monitored 
developments in other financial and real indicators in reaching a decision on the appropriate level 
of short-term interest rates. Therefore an evaluation of the inflation rate should also include part 
of this period in which the Reserve Bank of South Africa used the informal targeting. 
The data source is the South African Reserve Bank database. The cpix index has been defined as 
the headline consumer price index excluding food and non-alcoholic beverages, home owner’s 
costs and value-added tax and the data has been retrieved from the Statistics South Africa (SSA). 
The methodology of core inflation excludes the elements whose short-term behaviour and differs 
from the underlying price trends. Thus this research has considered the fact that in the short run, 
the changes in indicator variables may not necessarily change the rate of inflation immediately as 
they behave at that moment. Therefore a long term trend has to be examined to find whether the 
inflation indicator variables are a true replica of the rate of inflation in South Africa. 
The following is a list of the inflation indicators that has been employed along with their 
definitions: 
An oil price, oil, refers to the price per barrel of Brent crude oil and is available from the SARB 
on a quarterly base. Money supply, M3 is the quarterly average of monthly Money supply, M3 
data on the SARB website. The exchange rate, exch, is the foreign exchange rate South Africa 
cent per USA dollar using middle rates (R1 = 100 cents) on a quarterly base from the SARB 
website.  The total employment, empl, rate is found by finding the aggregate of private and 
public employment rates from the SARB website. Gold price, gold, explains the price of gold 
and is shown also on a quarterly base from the SARB website. The interest rates, inte, is the 
money market interest rates available on the SARB website. The total interest rates were 
calculated by averaging the different interest rates to reach quarterly data. The data for interest 
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rates starts on the forth quarter of 1998. The reason being that a new system of monetary 
accommodation was introduced with daily tenders of liquidity through repurchase transactions 
early 1998.  
 
6.2 Empirical methodology and results  
 
6.2.1 Evaluation of inflation indicators 
 
Model specification and robustness 
 
In this study, econometric models have been used to empirically evaluate each of the inflation 
indicator variables. Each of the inflation indicator variables has been used to find how they relate 
to the rate of inflation in the South African economy. The overall inflation model that has been 
estimated in this study uses the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method employing time series 
data for the period 1997:Q2 to 2008:Q3 which is a  period long enough to allow for cointegration 
analysis of the variables. The period under study is the initial phase of the explicit inflation 
targeting regime in South Africa that lasted until the end of 2008 when the global financial crisis 
began. Of which after the crisis, the SARB followed a more flexible monetary policy regime, 
placing more emphasis on economic growth and financial stability. The following cointegration 
regression has been considered as been used by Cecchetti, S. G., 1995; Marques, R. C., et al., 
2000; Cecchetti, S. G., et al., 2000; Freeman, D. G., 1997: 
 
……………..……………………………………………………………….... (1) 
Where; 
  = (cpix) represents the rate of inflation. 
= is the inflation from t+l to t+k,  
x             = is the inflation indicator (M3, gdp, oil, exch, empl, cpix) 
L    =represents the lagged values of the inflation rate and the inflation indicator variable 
and equation (1) will only be stationary if  is equal to zero.  
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The value of (cpix) is the measure that the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) uses when 
considering the interest rate level for money that the SARB lend to commercial banks known as 
the repo rate (initially, the inflation target was set to keep the Consumer Price Index excluding 
mortgage costs (CPIX) – a key indicator of inflation – between 3% and 6% average per annum), 
M3 is the total money supply, empl the number of people employed in the particular point of 
study, oil is the price oil, gdp is output growth and exch is the exchange rate as defined above. 
The short-run increases in oil prices, gold prices, output, employment, money supply (M3), and 
the exchange rates may not essentially signal an ensuing rise in the general price level. The level 
of each of these inflation indicators may not drift too far apart from the price level in the long 
term, that is, they may be cointegrated. This can be only if there is a dynamic relationship 
between each of the inflation indicators and the inflation rate. An error-correction model can 
then be formulated. The predictive performance of gold prices, interest rates, total employment, 
oil prices, output growth and M3 against the rate of inflation (cpix) using an approach based on 
cointegration and error-correction modeling can then be examined as shown in data analysis 
below ( see 6.3). As will be reviewed below, the results have been surprisingly encouraging as 
the coefficients of all the indicator variables are significant and this enhances the predictive value 
of the model (see Appendix 6: Tables 7.21, 7.25, 7.31, 7.37, 7.43 and 7.50). Given the statistical 
significance of the coefficients of all the indicator variables towards the rate of inflation, the 
above model should not be rejected. 
 6.2.2 Assumptions in an inflation targeting regime 
 
In the process of data evaluation, there are assumptions taken into account. These might be part 
of the shortcomings of inflation targeting regime. An important shortcoming is the assumption 
that the economic environment of monetary policy remains in essence unchanged in the period 
under consideration and that low inflation is the proper objective of monetary policy. It is not 
always the case that the same type of shocks in different periods affects the rate of inflation with 
the same magnitude and this means inflation rate may not be fixed on a same rate for a long 
period. If a shock comes, there is likely to be a change in the rate of inflation possibly with a lag 
and this affects the rate of inflation for the period ahead.  
The fact that inflation targeting is logically reliant on forecasting represents a weakness of the 
inflation targeting technique, the reason being that forecasts are inherently unreliable. In this 
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study, the analysis necessarily assumes that all exogenous shocks are drawn from the same 
distribution and that monetary policymakers interpreted their environment in this way. This is 
obviously a very strong assumption and one that is hard to verify. But if we cannot be sure that 
monetary policy responds as described by empirical reaction function, then analysis loses much 
of its strength. 
Conclusively, these assumptions may be a misconception due to the fact that most of the 
monetary policy techniques has to take account of the fact that policy changes made now do not 
affect inflation until sometime in the future. Most economic policy instruments have their effect 
only after a time delay. Thus this research lagged the values of the indicator variables to cater for 
such changes that can be realized in future. 
6.3 Data analysis  
 
In analysing data, for robust results, stationarity tests using the Augmented Dickey Fuller and 
Phillips-Perron tests has been carried out to check if the random time series is stationary. 
Cointegration tests using the Johansen approach (1988) has been conducted to see if there is a 
long term relationship between the variables. The Johansen approach is chosen since it has a 
number of advantages over the Engle-Granger two stage approach to cointegration. At the outset, 
as this is a VAR based technique, less concern is needed over whether the explanatory variables 
are exogenous or endogenous. The Johansen methodology is considered superior over the 
conventional Engle-Granger methodology due to the fact that, firstly if a multiple cointegrating 
vector exists, then the use of the Engle-Granger method may simply produce a complex linear 
combination of all the distinct cointegrating vectors that cannot be sensibly interpreted. This 
approach is preferred as it captures the underlying time series properties of the data and is a 
systems equation test that provides estimates of all cointegrating relationships that may exist 
within a vector of nonstationary variables or a mixture of stationary and nonstationary variables. 
However, the Johansen method provides a unified framework for the estimation and testing of 
cointegrating relations in the context of VAR (vector auto regression) error correction models. 
Secondly, the Engle-Granger method relies on a super convergence result and applies OLS in 
order to obtain parameter estimates of the cointegrating vector. However, OLS parameter 
estimate may vary with the arbitrary normalization. In Johansen method two tests may be used to 
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determine the number of cointegrating vectors: the trace test and the maximum eigen value test. 
Both of them have been employed in the process of evaluation. 
In addition, restrictions can be applied to the cointegrating vectors, which is not possible with the 
Engle-Granger approach. Since cointegration tests only shows the long-term relationship 
between variables, an Error Correction Model (ECM) has been specified since in the short-run 
the variables maybe in disequilibrium, with the disturbances being the equilibrating error. The 
dynamics of this short-run disequilibrium relationship between the variables has been described 
by the Error Correction Model (ECM). 
In conclusion, the Dickey-Fuller tests as with any other unit root tests have its own flaws. 
Gujarati (2003) state that most tests of the Dickey –Fuller type have low predictive power and 
they tend to accept the null of unit root more frequently than is warranted i.e. may find a unit 
root even when none exists. The predictive power depends on the time span of the data more 
than mere size of the sample. In addition, the Dickey-Fuller test is weak in its ability to detect a 
false null hypothesis. The focus in this research is to use the Augmented Dickey Fuller tests and 
correlogram. 
6.4 Stationarity (unit root) tests  
 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) requires condition of stationarity and using OLS on non-
stationary variables can lead to spurious results. In order to check the robustness of the 
conclusions, two methods of testing for unit root tests have been employed. The Dickey Fuller 
and correlogram has been used. The results for stationarity tests using the correlogram are shown 
in Appendix 3, figures 7.5 and 7.6. The stationarity tests for the cpix on table 6.5 shows cpix 
non-stationary and table 6.6 shows cpix being stationary by first differencing it. The conclusions 
coincides the one drawn using the Dickey Fuller tests with a constant. A stationary series can be 
defined as one with a constant mean, constant variance and constant auto covariance for each 
given lag.  
 
This research started by first establishing variables to be stationary or convert non-stationary 
variables into stationary variables before undertaking OLS for time series. If nonstationary 
variables are employed in a regression, then the standard assumptions for asymptotic analysis 
 86 
 
will not be valid. Thus, the usual t-ratios will not follow a t-distribution and the F-statistic will 
not follow an F-distribution. Because of spurious and or nonsense regression, unit root or 
stationarity tests should be done on all the variables before estimating the parameters and testing 
for cointegration. For consistence, this research study employed the Dickey Fuller with a 
constant to determine the evidence of stationarity or non-stationarity. This is very crucial 
especially in determining the order of integration of variables in order to do cointegration 
analysis (see Appendix 3 and 4). Cointegration itself refers to a linear combination of non-
stationary variables and a time series variable is non-stationary if its mean is increasing over 
time. Variables can be cointegrated if they are non-stationary and may be stationary after 
differencing them. If time series variables are cointegrated, it means that their trends can adjust 
to an equilibrium state and error-correction models could be identified to adjust for short run 
deviations.  
 
A test was done for the cpix for evidence of (non)stationarity using the Dickey Fuller tests with 
the null hypothesis of nonstationarity proposed by Dickey and Fuller (1979) and Phillips and 
Perron (1988). Using the null hypothesis that the variable is nonstationary I(1) series against the 
alternatives hypothesis of stationary I(0) series, the stationarity tests for the variables cpix  was 
found to be non- stationarity. Table 6.2 below indicates that the null cannot be rejected at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level of significance. This implies that the series is I(1) and this is also consistent 
with other research papers and research done by Marques, R. C., et al., 2000
11
. Thus, results from 
the tests are consistent and suggest the need for first differencing of the variables to achieve 
stationarity. Table 6.2 below shows the results for the stationary tests for the rate of inflation 
with the indicator variables. 
 
                                                             
11
 Marques, R. C., et al., (2000).Why should Central Banks avoid the use of the 
underlying inflation indicator? Volume 75, Issue 1, March 2002, Pages 17-23 
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Table 6.2: Stationarity tests for cpix against other variables 
 
DICKEY-FULLER TEST FOR UNIT ROOT 
 
  
             Critical values 
 Variables Test statistic 1% 5% 10% 
Cpix -1.41 -3.614 -2.944 -2.606 
Empl -3.91 -3.614 -2.944 -2.606 
m3 11.03 -3.614 -2.944 -2.606 
Gold -8.186 -3.614 -2.944 -2.606 
Gdp 4.276 -3.614 -2.944 -2.606 
Oil 2.113 -3.614 -2.944 -2.606 
Exch -5.056 -3.614 -2.944 -2.606 
Inte -3.608 -3.655 -2.961 -2.613 
 
The table above shows that the indicator variables cpix and oil are nonstationary at 1%, 5% and 
10% significant levels. The variable inte is nonstationary at 1% significant level and stationary at 
5% and 10% significant levels. Only empl, M3, gold, gdp and exch are stationary at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels of significance. For the variables cpix and oil to be stationary, the variables were then 
differenced for them to be stationary. This is consistent with other researchers who found 
stationarity of their variables after first differencing them (See Sanchez-Fung
 12
). Test results 
reported at the bottom of Appendix 4 indicate that all the variables became stationary after first-
differencing. Tables 7.7, 7.8, 7.9, 7.10, 7.11 and 7.14 shows all the variables being stationary at 
1%, 5% and 10% significant levels. After performing the first difference, the series was now I(0) 
process and represents stationary data. See Table 6.3 below showing all variables being 
stationary. 
                                                             
12
Sanchez-Fung, R. J., (2003). Inflation targeting and monetary analysis in Chile and 
Mexico. School of Economics, Kingston University, Penrhyn Road, Kingston upon Thames, 
Surrey, KT1 2EE, England, UK. JEL classification numbers: E30; E40; E50; F41. 
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Table 6.3: Dickey-Fuller test for unit root after first differencing oil, inte and cpix 
 
  
             Critical values 
 Variables Test statistic 1% 5% 10% 
Cpix -7.517 -3.621 -2.947 -2.607 
Empl -3.91 -3.614 -2.944 -2.606 
m3 11.03 -3.614 -2.944 -2.606 
Gold -8.186 -3.614 -2.944 -2.606 
Gdp 4.276 -3.614 -2.944 -2.606 
Oil -5.426 -3.621 -2.947 -2.607 
Exch -5.056 -3.614 -2.944 -2.606 
Inte -4.222 -3.662 -2.964 -2.614 
 
From Table 6.3 above, the empl, gold, exch, M3 and gdp variables were tested for stationarity 
and it has been found that all these variables were stationary without differencing them. The unit 
root test used was the standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. The research tested for 
evidence of (non)stationarity tests with the null hypothesis of nonstationarity proposed by 
Dickey and Fuller using the null hypothesis that the variable is nonstationary I(1) series against 
the alternatives hypothesis of stationary I(0) series. The series was an I(0) process and this 
represents stationarity. This is clearly indicated in Table 3 above that shows all variables being 
stationary at 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels. For all variables, the test statistic comfortably 
exceeds the critical value and so the null of a unit root is rejected for all the variables considered. 
6.5 The economic relationship between the inflation rate and the inflation indicators 
 
The inflation indicator variables are all consistent with the economic intuition. There is a 
negative relationship between the exchange rate and the inflation rate. As the inflation rate 
increases, the exchange rate falls (indicated by a negative coefficient of -0.1166). Check results 
in Appendix 6, Table 7.40. Depreciation of the rand leads to increased foreign demand for 
domestically produced goods and services through increased exports of goods and higher import 
prices that lead to inflation. Secondly, the price of oil is positively related to the rate of inflation 
(coefficient of 0.1261) indicating that an increase in the oil price will result in a surge in the rate 
of inflation. The results are clearly shown in Table 7.47. This is significant and is consistent with 
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the economic theory. The results are similar to those by Burger, P. and Marinkov, M., (2009)
13
. 
The authors found that there is a positive link between the oil price and inflation in South Africa. 
This means that not only does an increase in the oil price contribute to a higher inflation rate with 
the effect not diminishing after the implementation of an official inflation targeting regime, but 
also leads to an increase in the quadratic forecast error of inflation. In other words, the price of 
oil and inflation are often connected in a cause and effect relationship. 
The output growth is positively related to the rate of inflation which is also consistent with 
theory other studies like Girijasankar, M. and Anis, C., (2001). The authors find evidence of a 
long-run positive relationship between GDP growth rate and inflation for all four South Asian 
countries (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka). The coefficient of output growth in this 
study is positive 3.84 and is shown in Table 7.34. This undoubtedly states that a real increase in 
output growth would possibly result in an increase in the rate of inflation. As a result, it is called 
a procyclic (or procyclical) economic indicator. This simply means that it moves in the same 
direction as the economy. So if the economy is doing well, the coefficient will usually be 
increasing, whereas if there is a recession this indicator coefficient will be decreasing.  
The money supply (M3) is also positively related to the inflation rate with the coefficient of 1.27 
and the results are shown in Appendix 6, Table 7.25. This is economically significant and 
explains that the increases in money supply in the South African economy result in increases the 
inflation rate. The empl is positively related to d.cpix with a coefficient of 0.253204 as indicated 
in Table 7.21. This is consistent with the theory and it means that a decrease in inflation would 
lead to an increase in the rate of unemployment. Therefore, unemployment is a countercyclic (or 
countercyclical) economic indicator as it moves in the opposite direction as the economy. The 
unemployment rate gets larger as the economy gets worse so it is a countercyclic economic 
indicator.  
The interest rates are negatively related to the rate of inflation with a coefficient of -1.153 and 
this is consistent with theory which states that inflation rate and the real interest rate appear to 
move in opposite directions at all time. Inflation affects the time value of money, therefore, an 
                                                             
13
 Burger, P. and Marinkov, M., (2009). Inflation targeting and inflation performance in 
South Africa. Department of Economics, University of the Free State, JEL codes: E31, E52 
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anticipated change in inflation would lead to a corresponding change in interest rates. In case of 
a rise in inflation, lenders know that inflation will erode the value of their money over the term 
of the loan so they increase the interest rate to compensate for that loss. Lastly, the price of gold 
is positively related to the rate of inflation with a coefficient of gold being 0.0431133 as shown 
in Table 7.28. This implies that the rise in the price of gold prices has a proportionate effect of 
increasing the rate of inflation in South Africa. 
It can be deduced from the relationship between the inflation rate and the indicators of inflation 
that the output growth, the exchange rate, interest rates, money supply (M3) and the price of oil 
explains much of the variations of inflation rate in South Africa. These inflation indicators must 
be incorporated when predicting the inflation rate within the economy in South Africa under the 
inflation targeting regime. This evidently states that the monetary policy makers must 
incorporate these variables in forecasting the rate of inflation within the South African economy.  
6.6 Cointegration tests and error-correction modeling: Engle-Granger Test 
 
Testing for co-integration combines the problems of unit root tests and tests with parameters 
unidentified under the null. Cointegration can be defined simply as the long-term, or equilibrium, 
relationship between two series. As aforementioned, two time series are cointegrated if both are 
integrated of the same order and there exists a linear combination of the two time series that is 
I(0), that is they are stationary. They can be integrated also if each has a long run component and 
the components cancel out between the series. The cointegrated data are never expected to drift 
too far away from each other and they maintain an equilibrium relationship. Variables may be 
cointegrated if they move in tandem in the long-term, reflecting a long-term stable relationship. 
The purpose of cointegration tests is to determine whether the variables in the model are 
cointegrated or not. The cointegration of two or more time series suggests that there is a long-run 
or equilibrium relationship between them. The economic interpretation of cointegration is that if 
two or more series are linked to form an equilibrium relationship spanning in the long- run, then 
even though the series themselves may be non-stationary, they will move closely together over 
time and their difference will be stationary. Their long-run relationship is the equilibrium to 
which the system converges over time, and the disturbance term can be interpreted as the 
disequilibrium error or the distance that the system is away from equilibrium at time t. This 
research first checked for spurious regression before undertaking the cointegration tests and there 
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is no evidence of spurious regression between the variables and the inflation rate (results in 
appendix 6). 
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6.7 Methodology and econometric framework-Johansen tests 
 
After establishing that the relevant variables are cointegrated, the research paper then estimates 
an error correction model. In an error-correction model, the short-term dynamics of the variables 
in the system are influenced by the deviation from equilibrium. The first step is to first check for 
the stationarity of the residuals in order to perform the Johansen tests. All the residuals were 
stationary. 
     
            
 
 
 
The research tested for the stationarity of the residuals and all of them were stationary (figure 
6.2). If the residuals are stationary, then the series are cointegrated. Prima facie evidence of the 
normality of the residuals are shown in Appendix 1 (figures 7.3, 7.4, 7.5, 7.6 and 7.7) and line 
graphs of the residuals in Appendix 2 (figures 7.8, 7.9, 7.10, 7.11 ,7.12, 7.13 and 7.15) which 
shows that the residuals are stationary and represents a long-term relationship between the cpix 
and the variables. The ECM is important for many reasons such as that it is a convenient model 
measuring the correction from disequilibrium of the previous period which has a very good 
economic implication. ECMs have great merits as they are formulated in terms of first 
differences which typically eliminate trends from the variables involved; they resolve the 
0 
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Figure 6.2: Testing the stationarity of the residuals-cpix and empl 
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problem of spurious regressions. The other advantage of ECMs is the ease with which they can 
fit into the general-to-specific approach to econometric modeling, which is in fact a search for 
the most parsimonious ECM model that best fits given data sets. Lastly, the fact that the 
disequilibrium error term is stationary because the ECM has important implications such as the 
fact that the two variables are cointegrated implies that there is some adjustment process which 
prevents the errors in the long-run relationship becoming larger and larger. 
The test for cointegration which is employed in this paper was developed by Johansen (1988, 
1991) and Johansen and Julius (1990) as aforementioned. The reasons that the Johansen 
methodology is considered superior over the conventional Engle-Granger methodology are: first, 
if a multiple cointegrating vector exist the use of the Engle-Granger method may simply produce 
a complex linear combination of all the distinct cointegrating vectors that cannot be sensibly 
interpreted. Most of these advantages are listed and explained in this Chapter under 6.3.  
 
Once the variables in the VAR model are found to be cointegrated, we specify and estimate the 
error correction model (ECM) including the error-correction term which is used to investigate 
the dynamic behaviour of the model (Appendix 6). The size of the ECM term indicates the speed 
of adjustment of any disequilibrium towards a long run equilibrium state.  
 
6.8 Empirical findings 
 
The research has employed the ADF and PP test with a trend to determine the degree of 
integration of each variable. The lags of each individual series were selected in such a manner to 
render the ADF test residuals free of autocorrelation. The results of the ADF and PP tests, 
applied to level and first difference data, are reported in Appendix 4.  
 
From the data, for example, it shows that there exists a linear combination between the variables 
cpix and oil. Since these two variables are cointegrated, it means that they have an error 
correction representation. This means that the short-term changes in the cpix reflect not only its 
own past changes and those of the oil variable, but also current adjustment to correct for past 
deviations (errors) from the stable long-term relationship. This has been the case for all the other 
variables as can be seen from the results indicated. The research employed the procedure 
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suggested by Johansen (1988) which provides a unified framework for testing for the number of 
cointegrating vectors. The values of the test statistic however, indicate that the null hypothesis of 
no cointegrating vector cannot be rejected at the 5% level over the period 1997:Q2-2008:Q3. The 
results of the Johansen tests are presented in the Table 6.4 below as follows: 
 
Table 6.4: Johansen tests for cointegration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The critical values for the Trace test at 5% significant level is 15.41. The figures for the trace 
statistic reported above are all significant at level of significance of 5%. This shows that the all 
the variables are cointegrated with the cpix.  
 
A test was also done for cointegration by checking the stationarity of the residuals using 
graphical method and the results are consistent as found above. The results are indicated in 
Appendix 1. The test for cointegration shows that there is long run relationship among the 
variables.  
 
6.9 Policy implications based on cointegration results  
 
Through rigorous time series analysis, the research found that there is a long run relationship 
between the inflation indicators and the rate of inflation. The analysis confirms that inflation 
indicator variables are an exceptional policy tool to determine the rate of inflation in the long run 
in South Africa in line with this research paper’s hypothesis. The indicator variables selected are 
 
   
  
             Critical values 
 Variables Trace statistic 5%  level of significance 
Empl 33.1263 15.41 
m3 41.9422 15.41 
Gold 45.8039 15.41 
Gdp 39.9189 15.41 
Oil 28.9418 15.41 
Exch 33.5826 15.41 
Inte 39.1175 15.41 
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a true replica of the cause of inflation in South Africa. These indicators of inflation may give the 
direction to what trend will the rate of inflation follow in the long-run given they are correctly 
incorporated in the prediction of inflation. In predicting and targeting inflation, the inflation 
indicators must be incorporated for excellent forecasting of inflation rate. 
 96 
 
Chapter 7 
 
7.0 Conclusions, recommendations and areas for further research 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Inflation indicators have been subject to study in countries that had adopted inflation targeting as 
seen from the studied literature in this research paper. The relationship between the inflation rate 
and its indicators is essential for different groups/stakeholders within the economy. It is against 
this particular background that it was necessary to investigate the relationship between the rate of 
inflation and its indicators. The overall objective or the primary concern of this study was to 
investigate whether there is a long-run relationship between the rate of inflation and its indicators 
in South Africa. 
This study considered theoretical literature from different papers that evaluated inflation 
indicators using different methods of evaluation. In this study a number of different theoretical 
literature reviews has been reviewed. Some of these studies used econometric models to test 
whether there is a constant long-run relationship between the rate of inflation and the inflation 
rate empirically. The majority of these studies found that most of the indicators of inflation have 
a long term relationship with the rate of inflation reflecting that the indicators are useful in the 
determination of inflation in a given economy.   
In order to determine the long run relationship between the rate of inflation and the inflation 
indicators, the Johansen cointegration and error correction methodology was preferred to other 
techniques because of the merits to other methodology as explained in Chapter 6. 
Johansen cointegration tests provided evidence that there is one cointegrating vector. Evidence 
of cointegration allowed the estimation of VECMs, which provided the parameter estimates for 
the long run relationships. All the variables had been found to have a long run relationship with 
the rate of inflation.  
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7.2 Conclusion 
 
The main conclusion of this paper is broadly in line with several existing studies. The empirical 
results provided in this research support for an approach to policymaking that involves 
collecting, monitoring, and analysing a wide range of economic indicators. The results suggest 
that focusing attention too narrowly on one or a few indicators could be risky since the ability of 
any given indicator to predict inflation varies across different economic environments. A 
conclusion can be brought to light that all the inflation indicators are cointegrated with the 
inflation rate and may be useful in the determination and targeting inflation. There is a long run 
relationship between the inflation rate, the prices of oil, the employment rate, interest rate, the 
exchange rate, the money supply (M3) and the price of gold in South Africa. Although this might 
be the case, the policy makers must strive to use these results as a yardstick to decision making 
and may be a useful tool in forecasting inflation. Within the context of the outcomes detailed 
herein, and in line with the conclusions of the different scholars, this study recommends the 
continual use of inflation targeting as a monetary policy for the South African Reserve Bank in 
anchoring inflation expectations and inflation variability. 
 
It is then possible to conclude that the announcement of inflation targets in South Africa is 
essential as it communicates the central bank’s intentions to the financial markets and to the 
public and in so doing helps to reduce uncertainty about the future course of inflation. It is also 
crucial for the central bank to be able to convince the public that the inflation targeting 
framework will take precedence over other policy goals in case of conflict in South Africa. Since 
the inflation indicators evaluated have been found to be useful in the prediction of inflation in 
South Africa, it is therefore important to note that the targeting of one of the indicators will not 
provide a good monetary stance. For example, focusing narrowly on exchange rate stability is 
risky as the exchange rate instead of the inflation target may become the nominal anchor of 
monetary policy. This could lead to a tightening of monetary policy at times when inflation 
expectations and forecasts do not suggest that inflationary pressures are increasing, or vice versa. 
Too much concern about exchange rate stability can induce a wrong policy response. Targeting 
the exchange rate only is likely to worsen the performance of monetary policy and could under 
certain circumstances even lead to a recession in an economy.  
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On the other hand, it is possible to conclude that decision making on the appropriate monetary 
policy stance is not always easy and clear. For instance, where economic growth is well below 
potential, with rising inflation and an appreciating foreign currency, it is not so easy to decide on 
the appropriate monetary policy stance. Lowering of interest rates could only benefit on 
economic growth and weakening of the foreign currency value consequently leading to a further 
acceleration in inflation in this case. All in all it means that there is no appropriate indicator of 
inflation that can be targeted to keep the rate inflation in track and to very minimum positive 
value. A combination of all the indicator variables in this case in forecasting inflation would be 
recommended. 
 
7.3 Recommendations 
 
The effects of inflation indicators on the rate of inflation using South African data during the 
phase of SARB’s inflation-targeting monetary policy regime were investigated. Very few 
previous studies have empirically investigated the effects of inflation indicators during an 
inflation-targeting monetary policy period. Thus, this paper is an attempt to fill this gap and to 
uncover the variety of interesting relationships specific to an inflation-targeting era. The 
important part is the identification and analysis of the various inflation indicators in relation to 
the rate of inflation. The study concluded that the inflation indicators move in tandem with the 
rate of inflation in the long run with the output growth, the exchange rate and the price of oil 
explaining much of the variations of inflation rate in South Africa. Amid high global fuel and 
food prices threatening to derail monetary-policy plans, the SARB need to clearly identify and 
communicate their inflation targets or risk undermining their credibility in the markets. I would 
recommend that the Reserve Bank should continue pursuing inflation targeting as it is still 
reaping good fruits according to these results obtained in this study. Inflation targeting has 
proved to be an efficient way of anchoring inflation expectations in South Africa. Price stability 
according to these results obtained is inevitable. Although the evaluated ancient alternatives 
might be useful to the South African economy since there is no best monetary policy stance for 
an economy at all times, the inflation targeting framework is still proving to be a good measure 
for holding the inflation rate to lower levels although sometimes out of the target range. 
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7.4 Limitation of the study and areas of further research 
 
Although some research findings and the results are consistent with other studies from different 
countries that studied inflation indicators, there are few shortcomings/drawbacks. Albeit there is 
evidence that the stated objectives were successfully achieved and it is a potentially worthwhile 
contribution to inflation targeting as a monetary policy in South Africa, the first limitation 
centres on the credibility of the data, which, having been sourced from the SARB, may not be as 
credible as when it was obtained as primary data. The motive behind the use of the secondary 
data from SARB is that the data have been worked on and therefore will be appropriate for this 
study. The other limitation of the study pertains to the interpretation of results where, with only 
one test having been assessed (cointegration), generalization of findings will also be equally 
limited.  
For further study, the most interesting part will be comparing how other African countries’ 
inflation indicators are performing compared to the performance of South African indicators. 
This will reflect how the South African economy is performing in relation to other countries that 
are also using the inflation targeting framework. 
In conclusion, specific outcomes and recommendations that are both academic and practical 
value were clearly articulated. It further identifies specific areas of research with the potential to 
reinforce the outcomes. 
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 Data appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Histogram of residuals showing normal distribution 
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Figure 7.3: Histogram of cpix and m3 showing a normal distribution 
Figure 7.4: Histogram of the residuals-cpix and gold 
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Figure 7.5: Histogram of the residuals-d.cpix and gdp 
Figure 7.6: Histogram of the residuals-d.cpix and empl 
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              Figure 7.8: Histogram of the residuals-d.cpix and inte  
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Figure 7.7:  Histogram of the residuals-cpix and oil 
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Appendix 2: Trend of variables over time 
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Figure 7.9: Line of the residuals-d.cpix and empl       
Figure 7.10: Line graph of d.cpix and gold residuals over time 
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Figure 7.11: Line graph of d.cpix and gdp residuals over time 
Figure 7.12: Line graph of cpix and oil residuals over time 
Figure 7.13: Line graph of cpix and exch residuals over time 
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Figure 7.14: Line graph of the residuals between cpix and m3 
Figure 7.15: Cpix trend over time 
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Figure 7.16: D.cpix-stationary 
Figure 7.17: Line graph of m3 over time 
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Figure 7.18: The trend of gold prices graphically over time 
Figure 7.19: The trend of gdp prices graphically over time  
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Figure 7.20: The trend of oil prices graphically over time    
Figure 7.21: Line graph of exch over time 
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Figure 7.22: Line graph of interest rates over time. The vertical axis shows interest rates in 
percentages (Source: SARB website) 
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Appendix 3: Unit root tests using correlogram 
 
Table 7.5: Stationarity tests for cpix using a correlogram: Cpix non-stationary 
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 Table 7.6: Stationarity tests for cpix using a correlogram: D.cpix stationary  
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Appendix 4: Stationarity unit root tests 
 
Table 7.7: Stationarity test for empl 
       _cons     .4785958   .7234357     0.66   0.512    -.9803513    1.937543
         L1.    -.5322495   .1361327    -3.91   0.000    -.8067873   -.2577118
        empl  
                                                                              
      D.empl        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0020
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -3.910            -3.614            -2.944            -2.606
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        45
 
 
 
Table 7.8: Stationarity test for m3 
       _cons    -10376.26   4426.819    -2.34   0.024    -19303.79   -1448.725
         L1.     .0536694   .0048656    11.03   0.000      .043857    .0634818
          m3  
                                                                              
        D.m3        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 1.0000
                                                                              
 Z(t)             11.030            -3.614            -2.944            -2.606
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        45
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 Table 7.9: Gold –testing for stationarity 
       _cons     4.968211   2.052883     2.42   0.020     .8281786    9.108243
         L1.    -1.220559   .1491084    -8.19   0.000    -1.521264   -.9198527
        gold  
                                                                              
      D.gold        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -8.186            -3.614            -2.944            -2.606
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        45
 
 
Table 7.10: GDP –testing for stationarity 
       _cons    -3637.988   3209.388    -1.13   0.263    -10110.34    2834.359
         L1.     .0408858   .0095608     4.28   0.000     .0216045    .0601671
         gdp  
                                                                              
       D.gdp        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 1.0000
                                                                              
 Z(t)              4.276            -3.614            -2.944            -2.606
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        45
 
 
Table 7.11: Exch –testing for stationarity 
       _cons    -.7451263   .9908596    -0.75   0.456    -2.743385    1.253133
         L1.    -.7449927   .1473547    -5.06   0.000    -1.042162   -.4478237
        exch  
                                                                              
      D.exch        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -5.056            -3.614            -2.944            -2.606
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        45
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Table 7.12: Oil prices –testing for stationarity 
       _cons    -.5635496   1.529322    -0.37   0.714    -3.647722    2.520623
         L1.     .0701086   .0331837     2.11   0.040     .0031872      .13703
         oil  
                                                                              
       D.oil        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.9988
                                                                              
 Z(t)              2.113            -3.614            -2.944            -2.606
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        45
 
 
Table 7.13: Oil prices non-stationary 
                                                                              
       _cons     1.845144   .9435018     1.96   0.057    -.0589194    3.749208
              
         LD.    -.8435978   .1554626    -5.43   0.000    -1.157334   -.5298616
         oil  
                                                                              
      D2.oil        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -5.426            -3.621            -2.947            -2.607
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        44
 
D.oil stationary 
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Table 7.14: Stationarity test for inte 
  
                                                                              
       _cons     1.830079    .576025     3.18   0.003     .6629415    2.997217
              
         L1.     -.210577   .0583617    -3.61   0.001    -.3288291   -.0923249
        inte  
                                                                              
      D.inte        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0056
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -3.608            -3.655            -2.961            -2.613
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        39
 
 
Table 7.15: Stationarity test for d.inte 
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0815857   .1684342    -0.48   0.631     -.423186    .2600147
              
         LD.    -.6472792   .1532961    -4.22   0.000    -.9581782   -.3363802
        inte  
                                                                              
     D2.inte        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0006
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -4.222            -3.662            -2.964            -2.614
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        38
 
Table 7.16: Stationarity test for cpix 
                                                                              
       _cons     1.376913   .8655277     1.59   0.119    -.3685898    3.122416
         L1.    -.1674683   .1187692    -1.41   0.166    -.4069892    .0720525
        cpix  
                                                                              
      D.cpix        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.5775
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -1.410            -3.614            -2.944            -2.606
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        45
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Table 7.17: First difference of cpix: D.cpix stationary 
                                                                              
       _cons     .2595494   .3311057     0.78   0.438    -.4086489    .9277477
         LD.    -1.149492   .1529238    -7.52   0.000    -1.458105   -.8408794
        cpix  
                                                                              
     D2.cpix        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -7.517            -3.621            -2.947            -2.607
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        44
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 Appendix 5: Checking for spurious regression between variables 
 
Table 7.18: Checking for spurious regression: D.cpix and empl 
 
                                                                              
       _cons      .234219   .3298212     0.71   0.481    -.4309289    .8993669
        empl     .0096554   .0614578     0.16   0.876    -.1142862    .1335969
                                                                              
      D.cpix        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    205.589765    44  4.67249467           Root MSE      =   2.186
                                                       Adj R-squared = -0.0227
    Residual    205.471824    43  4.77841452           R-squared     =  0.0006
       Model    .117941136     1  .117941136           Prob > F      =  0.8759
                                                       F(  1,    43) =    0.02
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      45
 
Since R-squared < d then there is no evidence of spurious regression 
 
 
Table 7.19: Newey-west test for standard errors: Dcpix and empl 
                                                                              
       _cons      .234219   .2652023     0.88   0.382    -.3006125    .7690504
        empl     .0096554   .0354153     0.27   0.786    -.0617664    .0810771
                                                                              
      D.cpix        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Newey-West
                                                                              
                                                    Prob > F       =    0.7864
maximum lag: 20                                     F(  1,    43)  =      0.07
Regression with Newey-West standard errors          Number of obs  =        45
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 Table 7.20: Dickey fuller test for the residuals: D.cpix and empl 
                                                                              
       _cons     -.019457   .3288394    -0.06   0.953    -.6830818    .6441677
         L1.    -1.159497   .1526339    -7.60   0.000    -1.467524   -.8514691
         res  
                                                                              
       D.res        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -7.597            -3.621            -2.947            -2.607
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        44
 
The residuals are stationary representing a long-run relationship between the inflation rate and the 
employment levels. 
 
 
Table 7.21: The newey-west test for standard errors: D.cpix and m3 
       _cons    -.7756638   .4281412    -1.81   0.077    -1.639093    .0877653
          m3     1.20e-06   4.06e-07     2.95   0.005     3.80e-07    2.02e-06
                                                                              
      D.cpix        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Newey-West
                                                                              
                                                    Prob > F       =    0.0051
maximum lag: 20                                     F(  1,    43)  =      8.71
Regression with Newey-West standard errors          Number of obs  =        45
 
 
 
Table 7.22: Checking for spurious regression: D.cpix and m3 
       _cons    -.7756638   .7051311    -1.10   0.277    -2.197696    .6463686
          m3     1.20e-06   7.43e-07     1.62   0.114    -2.98e-07    2.70e-06
                                                                              
      D.cpix        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    205.589765    44  4.67249467           Root MSE      =  2.1231
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0353
    Residual    193.827014    43  4.50760499           R-squared     =  0.0572
       Model     11.762751     1   11.762751           Prob > F      =  0.1135
                                                       F(  1,    43) =    2.61
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      45
 
Since R-squared < d then there is no evidence of spurious regression 
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Table 7.23: Test for stationarity of the residuals: Dcpix and m3 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -8.089            -3.621            -2.947            -2.607
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        44
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Appendix 6: Checking for the coefficients of the variables: Error Correction Model (ECM). 
 
Table 7.24: Determining the coefficients:D.cpix and empl  
                                                                              
       _cons      .200808   .3373726     0.60   0.555    -.4805298    .8821457
         L1.    -.1678463   .1580499    -1.06   0.294    -.4870345    .1513419
        res1  
        empl     .0253204   .0636145     0.40   0.693    -.1031516    .1537924
                                                                              
      D.cpix        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     205.14726    43  4.77086652           Root MSE      =  2.2059
                                                       Adj R-squared = -0.0200
    Residual    199.511436    41  4.86613258           R-squared     =  0.0275
       Model    5.63582451     2  2.81791226           Prob > F      =  0.5649
                                                       F(  2,    41) =    0.58
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      44
 
The empl is positively related to d.cpix. This is consistent with the theory.  
 
Table 7.25: Estimating the error correction model: D.cpix and empl 
                                                                              
       _cons      .200808   .3373726     0.60   0.555    -.4805298    .8821457
         L1.    -.1678463   .1580499    -1.06   0.294    -.4870345    .1513419
        res1  
        empl     .0253204   .0636145     0.40   0.693    -.1031516    .1537924
                                                                              
      D.cpix        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     205.14726    43  4.77086652           Root MSE      =  2.2059
                                                       Adj R-squared = -0.0200
    Residual    199.511436    41  4.86613258           R-squared     =  0.0275
       Model    5.63582451     2  2.81791226           Prob > F      =  0.5649
                                                       F(  2,    41) =    0.58
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      44
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 Table 7.26: Correlation matrix: D.cpix and empl 
       _cons    -0.1680    0.0474    1.0000 
      L.res1    -0.2145    1.0000           
        empl     1.0000                     
                                            
        e(V)       empl    L.res1     _cons 
Correlation matrix of coefficients of regress model
 
 
 
Table 7.27: Johansen test for cointegration: D.cpix and empl 
                                                                               
    2      10     -213.26813     0.14860
    1      9        -216.727     0.45638      6.9177     3.76
    0      6       -229.8313           .     33.1263    15.41
  rank    parms       LL       eigenvalue  statistic    value
maximum                                      trace    critical
                                                         5%
                                                                               
Sample:  1998q1 - 2008q3                                         Lags =       2
Trend: constant                                         Number of obs =      43
                       Johansen tests for cointegration                        
 
 
Table 7.28: Coefficients of D.cpix and m3 
       _cons     -.865428   .7195746    -1.20   0.236    -2.318638    .5877825
         L1.    -.2140267   .1518936    -1.41   0.166    -.5207819    .0927286
        res1  
          m3     1.27e-06   7.51e-07     1.69   0.098    -2.44e-07    2.79e-06
                                                                              
      D.cpix        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     205.14726    43  4.77086652           Root MSE      =  2.1147
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0627
    Residual    183.342626    41  4.47177137           R-squared     =  0.1063
       Model    21.8046339     2  10.9023169           Prob > F      =  0.0999
                                                       F(  2,    41) =    2.44
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      44
 
The t-test is significant and this shows that there is a relationship between m3 and cpix 
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Table 7.29: Correlation matrix: D.cpix and m3 
       _cons    -0.8965   -0.0040    1.0000 
      L.res1     0.0042    1.0000           
          m3     1.0000                     
                                            
        e(V)         m3    L.res1     _cons 
Correlation matrix of coefficients of regress model
 
There is a positive relationship between the rate of inflation and increases in money supply (m3). This is 
consistent with theory.  
 
 
Table 7.30: Johansen test for cointegration: D.cpix and m3 
    2      10     -558.08341     0.29593
    1      9      -565.62734     0.46448     15.0879     3.76
    0      6      -579.05453           .     41.9422    15.41
  rank    parms       LL       eigenvalue  statistic    value
maximum                                      trace    critical
                                                         5%
                                                                               
Sample:  1998q1 - 2008q3                                         Lags =       2
Trend: constant                                         Number of obs =      43
                       Johansen tests for cointegration                        
 
 
 
Table 7.31: Regression analysis: D.cpix and gold 
 
       _cons     .0671822   .3288461     0.20   0.839    -.5959992    .7303636
        gold     .0431133   .0238642     1.81   0.078    -.0050135    .0912401
                                                                              
      D.cpix        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    205.589765    44  4.67249467           Root MSE      =   2.108
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0489
    Residual    191.085761    43  4.44385492           R-squared     =  0.0705
       Model     14.504004     1   14.504004           Prob > F      =  0.0778
                                                       F(  1,    43) =    3.26
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      45
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 Table 7.32: Newey-west test: D.cpix and gold 
       _cons     .0671822   .2932152     0.23   0.820    -.5241426     .658507
        gold     .0431133   .0230762     1.87   0.069    -.0034243    .0896509
                                                                              
      D.cpix        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Newey-West
                                                                              
                                                    Prob > F       =    0.0685
maximum lag: 20                                     F(  1,    43)  =      3.49
Regression with Newey-West standard errors          Number of obs  =        45
 
 
 
 
Table 7.33: Testing stationarity of the residuals: D.cpix and gold 
       _cons     .0204057   .3115314     0.07   0.948    -.6082902    .6491016
         L1.    -1.232317   .1503953    -8.19   0.000    -1.535827   -.9288066
         res  
                                                                              
       D.res        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -8.194            -3.621            -2.947            -2.607
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        44
 
 
 
Table 7.34: Checking for coeffients of the residuals: D.cpix and gold 
       _cons     .0575444   .3257623     0.18   0.861    -.6003458    .7154347
         L1.    -.2324324   .1519803    -1.53   0.134    -.5393629    .0744981
        res1  
        gold     .0529477   .0274129     1.93   0.060    -.0024138    .1083091
                                                                              
      D.cpix        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     205.14726    43  4.77086652           Root MSE      =   2.088
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0862
    Residual    178.741224    41  4.35954206           R-squared     =  0.1287
       Model     26.406036     2   13.203018           Prob > F      =  0.0593
                                                       F(  2,    41) =    3.03
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      44
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Table 7.35: Correlation matrix: D.cpix and gold 
       _cons    -0.2571    0.0166    1.0000 
      L.res1    -0.0021    1.0000           
        gold     1.0000                     
                                            
        e(V)       gold    L.res1     _cons 
Correlation matrix of coefficients of regress model
 
 
 
Table 7.36: Eigen values: D.cpix and gold 
    2      10     -247.18616     0.27287
    1      9      -254.03728     0.52600     13.7022     3.76
    0      6       -270.0881           .     45.8039    15.41
  rank    parms       LL       eigenvalue  statistic    value
maximum                                      trace    critical
                                                         5%
                                                                               
Sample:  1998q1 - 2008q3                                         Lags =       2
Trend: constant                                         Number of obs =      43
                       Johansen tests for cointegration                        
 
 
 
Table 7.37: Regression of D.cpix and gdp  
 
       _cons    -1.008859   .9449828    -1.07   0.292    -2.914598    .8968807
         gdp     3.84e-06   2.73e-06     1.41   0.167    -1.67e-06    9.35e-06
                                                                              
      D.cpix        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    205.589765    44  4.67249467           Root MSE      =   2.138
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0217
    Residual    196.549737    43  4.57092411           R-squared     =  0.0440
       Model    9.04002858     1  9.04002858           Prob > F      =  0.1668
                                                       F(  1,    43) =    1.98
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      45
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 Table 7.38: Newey-west test: D.cpix and gdp 
       _cons    -1.008859   .5973711    -1.69   0.098    -2.213572    .1958548
         gdp     3.84e-06   1.72e-06     2.23   0.031     3.73e-07    7.31e-06
                                                                              
      D.cpix        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Newey-West
                                                                              
                                                    Prob > F       =    0.0308
maximum lag: 20                                     F(  1,    43)  =      4.99
Regression with Newey-West standard errors          Number of obs  =        45
 
 
 
 
Table 7.39: Testing stationarity of the residuals: D.cpix and gdp 
       _cons    -.0287252   .3182339    -0.09   0.929    -.6709472    .6134967
         L1.    -1.199716   .1505775    -7.97   0.000    -1.503593   -.8958381
         res  
                                                                              
       D.res        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -7.967            -3.621            -2.947            -2.607
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        44
 
 
 
Table 7.40:  Checking for coeffients of the residuals: D.cpix and gdp 
       _cons    -1.152145   .9705695    -1.19   0.242     -3.11225    .8079602
         L1.    -.1998535   .1523776    -1.31   0.197    -.5075864    .1078793
        res1  
         gdp     4.19e-06   2.78e-06     1.51   0.140    -1.43e-06    9.81e-06
                                                                              
      D.cpix        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     205.14726    43  4.77086652           Root MSE      =  2.1361
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0436
    Residual    187.080242    41  4.56293274           R-squared     =  0.0881
       Model     18.067018     2  9.03350898           Prob > F      =  0.1511
                                                       F(  2,    41) =    1.98
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      44
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Table 7.41: Correlation matrix: D.cpix and gdp 
       _cons    -0.9434    0.0073    1.0000 
      L.res1    -0.0072    1.0000           
         gdp     1.0000                     
                                            
        e(V)        gdp    L.res1     _cons 
Correlation matrix of coefficients of regress model
 
 
 
Table 7.42: Eigen values: D.cpix and gdp 
    2      10      -530.7194     0.24115
    1      9      -536.65241     0.47920     11.8660     3.76
    0      6      -550.67883           .     39.9189    15.41
  rank    parms       LL       eigenvalue  statistic    value
maximum                                      trace    critical
                                                         5%
                                                                               
Sample:  1998q1 - 2008q3                                         Lags =       2
Trend: constant                                         Number of obs =      43
                       Johansen tests for cointegration                        
 
 
 
Table 7.43: Regression of D.cpix and exch 
 
       _cons     .1263777   .3071207     0.41   0.683    -.4929902    .7457456
        exch     -.116622   .0456822    -2.55   0.014     -.208749    -.024495
                                                                              
      D.cpix        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    205.589765    44  4.67249467           Root MSE      =  2.0376
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1114
    Residual    178.530823    43  4.15187961           R-squared     =  0.1316
       Model    27.0589422     1  27.0589422           Prob > F      =  0.0143
                                                       F(  1,    43) =    6.52
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      45
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 Table 7.44: Newey-west test: D.cpix and exch 
       _cons     .1263777   .2680185     0.47   0.640    -.4141331    .6668885
        exch     -.116622   .0376223    -3.10   0.003    -.1924946   -.0407493
                                                                              
      D.cpix        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Newey-West
                                                                              
                                                    Prob > F       =    0.0034
maximum lag: 20                                     F(  1,    43)  =      9.61
Regression with Newey-West standard errors          Number of obs  =        45
 
 
Table 7.45: Testing stationarity of the residuals: D.cpix and exch 
       _cons    -.0146597   .3019076    -0.05   0.962    -.6239339    .5946145
         L1.    -1.237829   .1505656    -8.22   0.000    -1.541683   -.9339755
         res  
                                                                              
       D.res        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -8.221            -3.621            -2.947            -2.607
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        44
 
 
 
Table 7.46: Checking for coeffients of the residuals: D.cpix and exch 
       _cons     .1159491   .3084346     0.38   0.709    -.5069471    .7388454
         L1.    -.2387063   .1526233    -1.56   0.125    -.5469354    .0695227
        res1  
        exch     -.112054   .0455926    -2.46   0.018    -.2041302   -.0199779
                                                                              
      D.cpix        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     205.14726    43  4.77086652           Root MSE      =  2.0264
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1393
    Residual    168.365538    41  4.10647654           R-squared     =  0.1793
       Model     36.781722     2   18.390861           Prob > F      =  0.0174
                                                       F(  2,    41) =    4.48
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      44
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 Table 7.47: Correlation matrix: D.cpix and exch 
       _cons     0.1369    0.0064    1.0000 
      L.res1    -0.0574    1.0000           
        exch     1.0000                     
                                            
        e(V)       exch    L.res1     _cons 
Correlation matrix of coefficients of regress model
 
 
 
Table 7.48: Eigen values: D.cpix and exch 
    2      10     -230.00353     0.21960
    1      9      -235.33439     0.41318     10.6617     3.76
    0      6      -246.79485           .     33.5826    15.41
  rank    parms       LL       eigenvalue  statistic    value
maximum                                      trace    critical
                                                         5%
                                                                               
Sample:  1998q1 - 2008q3                                         Lags =       2
Trend: constant                                         Number of obs =      43
                       Johansen tests for cointegration                        
 
 
 
Table 7.49: First difference of oil prices 
       _cons     1.845144   .9435018     1.96   0.057    -.0589194    3.749208
         LD.    -.8435978   .1554626    -5.43   0.000    -1.157334   -.5298616
         oil  
                                                                              
      D2.oil        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -5.426            -3.621            -2.947            -2.607
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        44
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 Table 7.50: Regression of D.cpix and d.oil 
       _cons    -.0305534   .3289424    -0.09   0.926    -.6939289    .6328221
         D1.     .1261466   .0543186     2.32   0.025     .0166026    .2356905
         oil  
                                                                              
      D.cpix        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    205.589765    44  4.67249467           Root MSE      =  2.0611
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0908
    Residual     182.67741    43  4.24831186           R-squared     =  0.1114
       Model    22.9123555     1  22.9123555           Prob > F      =  0.0250
                                                       F(  1,    43) =    5.39
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      45
 
 
 
Table 7.51: Newey-west test: D.cpix and d.oil 
       _cons    -.6401815   .3729505    -1.72   0.093    -1.392308    .1119449
         oil     .0214991   .0066689     3.22   0.002     .0080501    .0349481
                                                                              
      D.cpix        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Newey-West
                                                                              
                                                    Prob > F       =    0.0024
maximum lag: 20                                     F(  1,    43)  =     10.39
Regression with Newey-West standard errors          Number of obs  =        45
 
 
 
Table 7.52: Testing stationarity of the residuals: D.cpix and d.oil 
       _cons    -.0235917   .3115028    -0.08   0.940    -.6522298    .6050464
         L1.    -1.226544   .1498237    -8.19   0.000    -1.528901   -.9241877
         res  
                                                                              
       D.res        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -8.187            -3.621            -2.947            -2.607
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        44
 
 
 
 140 
 
 Table 7.53: Checking for coeffients of the residuals: D.cpix and d.oil 
       _cons    -.7107524   .5769846    -1.23   0.225    -1.875996    .4544916
         L1.    -.2268167   .1516483    -1.50   0.142    -.5330767    .0794432
        res1  
         oil     .0226297   .0116303     1.95   0.059    -.0008581    .0461176
                                                                              
      D.cpix        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     205.14726    43  4.77086652           Root MSE      =  2.0911
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0835
    Residual    179.273125    41  4.37251525           R-squared     =  0.1261
       Model     25.874135     2  12.9370675           Prob > F      =  0.0631
                                                       F(  2,    41) =    2.96
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      44
 
 
 
Table 7.54:  Correlation matrix: D.cpix and d.oil 
       _cons    -0.8375    0.0128    1.0000 
      L.res1    -0.0185    1.0000           
         oil     1.0000                     
                                            
        e(V)        oil    L.res1     _cons 
Correlation matrix of coefficients of regress model
 
 
 
Table 7.55:  Eigen values: D.cpix and d.oil 
    2      10     -223.85749     0.06733
    1      9      -225.35604     0.45303      2.9971*    3.76
    0      6      -238.32838           .     28.9418    15.41
  rank    parms       LL       eigenvalue  statistic    value
maximum                                      trace    critical
                                                         5%
                                                                               
Sample:  4 - 46                                                  Lags =       2
Trend: constant                                         Number of obs =      43
                       Johansen tests for cointegration                        
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Table 7.56: Checking for coeffients of the residuals: D.cpix and d.inte 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .0359093   .3766271     0.10   0.925    -.7279259    .7997444
              
         L1.    -1.152546   .1642357    -7.02   0.000    -1.485632   -.8194609
       resid  
                                                                              
     D.resid        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -7.018            -3.662            -2.964            -2.614
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        38
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Appendix 7: South African data used in the regressions 
 
Table 7.57:  Data used 
 
Date Cpix Oil Empl M3 Gold Gdp Exch inte 
1997Q2 5.9 18.55667 1.7 353382 -1.6 170682 0.9   
1997Q3 6.8 18.60667 -1.3 367452 48.3 175532 -3.7   
1997Q4 6.9 19.11667 -11.8 385056.7 -32.7 177407 -3.4   
1998Q1 6.7 14.84 -4.6 399138.3 6.5 176201 -2.9   
1998Q2 7.5 14.12 1.2 411925 -3.6 186158 -4.1   
1998Q3 8 13.06667 -2.2 421286 10.8 189138 -17.1   
1998Q4 7.6 11.89667 -0.6 432274 1 190927 7.7 17.6638 
1999Q1 6 11.48667 -3.8 434282.7 -1.7 190861 -5.2 16.34 
1999Q2 6.5 15.82 -3.4 443511.7 1.1 198944 -0.5 13.08769 
1999Q3 7 20.59 -9.9 453935.7 -9.9 210034 0.5 12.18 
1999Q4 7.3 23.96333 -6.7 476076.3 13.9 213844 -0.4 10.94154 
2000Q1 7.7 26.84333 -0.2 480570 4.9 214418 -2.7 10.08846 
2000Q2 9.4 26.67667 -8.2 482858 0.1 225851 -8.1 10.13154 
2000Q3 7.8 30.60333 -0.9 488549.7 2.1 239131 -2.1 8.72 
2000Q4 6.3 29.72333 -4.1 508555.7 4.4 242748 -7.9 9.1418 
2001Q1 6.7 25.87 -2.1 532171.7 7.7 243952 -2.9 9.5915 
2001Q2 5.3 27.27333 -3.2 548113.3 -20.4 252100 -2.6 9.65 
2001Q3 6.1 25.32667 0.4 572842.3 24.7 258388 -4 9.4346 
2001Q4 6.7 19.4 -0.3 591722.7 22.6 265567 -17 8.3315 
2002Q1 11.6 21.05 1.5 640595 26.9 272700 -12.5 9.61 
2002Q2 10.7 25.06 4.9 663867.3 -5.9 291173 10.5 10.3523 
2002Q3 10.8 26.93667 -3.1 677856.7 6 300113 0.1 11.7723 
2002Q4 11.4 26.76 -1.2 706965 -11.9 304713 8.5 12.6123 
2003Q1 5.3 31.61 -6.8 730335.7 -0.4 302458 15.3 11.8238 
2003Q2 3 26.08 -0.2 761273 -7.9 312548 7.4 12.6671 
2003Q3 4.8 28.5 4.3 774491 -5.8 321443 4.5 10.0692 
2003Q4 3.7 29.34667 6.7 798785 2.5 324244 10.2 7.1057 
2004Q1 6.5 31.91667 -0.1 833366.3 3.9 330744 -0.6 7.0785 
2004Q2 3.5 35.29667 11.5 850311.7 -5.7 342546 2.8 6.6331 
2004Q3 1.7 41.12667 -3.1 876039.3 -3.5 357345 3.4 7.6138 
2004Q4 5.7 44.29333 0.1 912445 4.2 364734 5.4 7.4131 
2005Q1 3 47.45333 8.7 938401.3 -2.1 363469 0.8 7.3877 
2005Q2 4.7 51.04333 6.9 987306 7.8 375116 -6.3 6.9315 
2005Q3 4.8 61.63667 5.8 1040027 2.2 396970 -1.6 6.8317 
2005Q4 3.8 56.97333 2.6 1076448 11.2 408421 -0.3 6.7943 
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2006Q1 3.7 61.45333 7.1 1154623 8.2 405479 6.1 6.1738 
2006Q2 4.6 69.44 5.9 1221971 19.1 419156 -4.3 6.3123 
2006Q3 7.7 69.53333 2.6 1265445 9.7 455657 -10 6.8085 
2006Q4 3.9 59.54667 9.1 1333959 0 464925 -2.2 7.4915 
2007Q1 4.8 57.86333 8.7 1404733 4.5 470926 1 7.9008 
2007Q2 9.1 69.03 0.9 1500424 0.6 483370 1.8 8.5538 
2007Q3 8.1 75.84333 5.7 1582699 3.7 511716 -0.1 9.1546 
2007Q4 9.7 89.07 8.4 1645453 8.7 533074 5.1 9.4969 
2008Q1 10.7 97.71333 2.9 1710418 32.6 539774 -9.9 10.6877 
2008Q2 15.4 121.3067 3.9 1806331 -1.5 566542 -3.4 10.8254 
2008Q3 16.8 115.8633 5.3 1854950 -4.2 589237 0 10.8277 
 
